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THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE—A PUBLIC BRANDING, 
IS THERE A REMEDY? 
INTRODUCTION 
Being accused of a more callous crime is hard to imagine.  In March 2006, 
two adult African-American female exotic dancers were hired to perform at a 
house occupied by members of the Duke lacrosse team.
1
  During the 
performance, which most of the Duke lacrosse team members attended, the 
men allegedly separated one of the entertainers from her partner and pulled her 
into the bathroom.
2
  The accuser claimed the door was closed behind her and 
that she was trapped.
3
  According to the accuser, one of the assailants said, 
“sweet heart, you can’t leave.”
4
  The woman attempted to leave, but the men 
allegedly prevented her from doing so.
5
  According to the accuser, three white 
players held her down by her arms and legs while they gang raped her for 
nearly half an hour.
6
 
The woman claimed that during the brutal rape, the lacrosse players “hit, 
kicked, and strangled” her.
7
  As the anal, vaginal, and oral rape continued, the 
woman struggled with all her might to free herself from the rapists, or at least 
that was her account of the evening’s events.
8
  She claimed that when she 
attempted to pry one of the Duke lacrosse player’s arms from around her neck, 
some of her fingernails snapped off.
9
  After allegedly robbing the woman of 
her dignity, the men were accused of stealing her money before they allowed 
 
 1. Details in Duke Rape Investigation Emerge, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 30, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12080776. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Details in Duke Rape Investigation Emerge, supra note 1; see also Susannah Meadows 
& Evan Thomas, A Troubled Spring at Duke, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2006, at 42. 
 7. Details in Duke Rape Investigation Emerge, supra note 1. 
 8. Ed Bradley, Duke Rape Suspects Speak Out, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/11/60minutes/main2082140.shtml; Evan Thomas & 
Susannah Meadows, Doubts About Duke, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 2006, at 22; Details in Duke Rape 
Investigation Emerge, supra note 1. 
 9. Meadows & Thomas, supra note 6; The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast 
Mar. 31, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12131984). 
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her to flee the bathroom.
10
  Once the woman left the house, a neighbor claimed 
he heard individuals from the house yelling racial slurs and other racially 
charged comments as the two adult entertainers left the scene.
11
  The accuser’s 
allegation resulted in a police investigation of “the crimes of first degree 
forcible rape, first degree kidnapping, first degree forcible sexual offense, 
common-law robbery, and felonious strangulation.”
12
 
After the above “details” of the alleged rape emerged, the Duke lacrosse 
rape story became the subject of what some deemed an “avalanche”
13
 of 
nationwide media attention because of its “heavy overtones of race and class” 
and a deluge of interviews granted by Durham District Attorney Mike 
Nifong.
14
  Mike Nifong appeared to voice his first public comments regarding 
the case on March 27, 2006, four days after reports stated that police ordered 
forty-six Duke lacrosse players to give DNA samples as part of the 
investigation.
15
  In the following weeks, Durham District Attorney Mike 
Nifong granted “more than 50 interviews, many on live national television,”
16
 
during which he “ferreted out a pattern of drunken misbehavior by jocks at an 
elite university.”
17
  During some of these interviews, Nifong reportedly stated 
that he was “convinced that there was a rape”
18
 and “[t]he circumstances of the 
rape indicated a deep racial motivation for some of the things that were 
done, . . .  It makes a crime that is by its nature one of the most offensive and 
invasive even more so.”
19
 
After weeks of media coverage that focused on details provided by the 
accuser, police, and prosecutor regarding the brutal gang rape, the defense 
team released evidence to the media that raised serious doubts about the 
accuser’s story and whether this assault ever occurred.
20
  While Nifong 
previously “express[ed] with absolute certainty that Duke lacrosse players had 
committed a horrific crime,” it is now clear that his beliefs, the articulation of 
 
 10. Meadows & Thomas, supra note 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Details in Duke Rape Investigation Emerge, supra note 1. 
 13. Jane Stancill, Lacrosse Defense Sways Media, NEWS & OBSERVER, July 16, 2006, at 1B. 
 14. Meadows & Thomas, supra note 6; Benjamin Niolet & Anne Blythe, Watch Your 
Words, Lacrosse Case Lawyers Told, NEWS & OBSERVER, July 18, 2006, at 1B. 
 15. Michael Biesecker et al., DA on the Spot for Comments, NEWS & OBSERVER, Apr. 22, 
2006, at 1A, 16A. 
 16. Niolet & Blythe, supra note 14. 
 17. Stancill, supra note 13. 
 18. Duke Lacrosse Team Accused of Gang Rape, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 29, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12065803. 
 19. Gitika Ahuja, Duke Rape Allegations Challenge Booming Sport, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 
29, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id=1784378. 
 20. Bradley, supra note 8 (indicating that 60 Minutes’ review of the file “reveals disturbing 
facts about the conduct of the police and the district attorney, and raises serious concerns about 
whether or not a rape even occurred”). 
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which “fueled explosive news coverage and fed public suspicion of the team,” 
were dead wrong and were formed “before much of the evidence was 
gathered.”
21
  In fact, Nifong’s statements were the result of a “tragic rush to 
accuse.”
22
 
Initially, Nifong indicated that DNA would be the foundation on which the 
prosecution would build its case, since the accuser stated that there were “no 
condoms used” and “at least one of her three attackers had ejaculated inside 
her.”
23
  However, subsequent DNA testing of every white Duke lacrosse player 
did not reveal a match; no DNA from any of the lacrosse players “was found 
on or inside the accuser or on her clothing,” despite the fact that the accuser 
received a full medical evaluation the evening of the attack when, presumably, 
the physical evidence was gathered.
24
  In addition to the absence of DNA 
evidence, the accuser’s ever-evolving tale made the claim that she was raped at 
the Duke lacrosse party even more doubtful.  The accuser gave varying 
accounts of the rape, claiming she was raped by “five guys,” then claiming she 
was raped by “three men,” while also stating that “no one had forced her to 
have sex.”
25
  Months after the indictment of the three lacrosse players, the 
accuser wavered in her story once again, saying she was unsure whether she 
was penetrated.
26
  Although the players still faced kidnapping and sexual 
assault charges, the accuser’s revelation forced Nifong to drop the rape 
charges.
27
  After taking over the case from Mike Nifong, who is now known as 
a “rogue prosecutor,”
28
 the North Carolina Attorney General conducted a full-
scale review of the case and determined that “the inconsistencies [in the 
accuser’s story] were so significant and so contrary to the evidence that the 
State had no credible evidence that an attack occurred in that house that 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Duke Lacrosse Players Relieved Case Has “Closure,” MSNBC.COM, Apr. 13, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18046103. 
 23. Bradley, supra note 8. 
 24. Id.  Although the accuser later picked her alleged attackers out of a photo line-up, the 
circumstances under which the line-up was conducted raise serious questions as to the reliability 
of the identification.  A few days after the party, the accuser was shown a photo line-up of thirty-
six Duke lacrosse players; she did not identify any of the players as her attacker.  Id.  Two weeks 
later, the accuser was shown another line-up, which consisted of a photograph of every white 
Duke lacrosse player.  Id.  She identified one of the indicted players with “90 percent” certainty 
but could not be sure because the “man who raped her had a mustache.”  Id.  Photographs taken 
on the night of the alleged attack show the identified player never had a mustache.  See id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Could be Ousted, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 30, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16408033. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Duke Lacrosse Players Relieved Case Has “Closure,” supra note 22. 
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night.”
29
  Most significantly, Attorney General Roy Cooper declared that the 
three Duke lacrosse players were “innocent of the criminal charges.”
30
 
Despite the Attorney General of North Carolina’s determination that the 
three accused Duke lacrosse players were innocent, the reputations of the 
indicted Duke lacrosse players, as well as the other members of the 2006 Duke 
lacrosse team who were cast under an umbrella of suspicion, were severely 
tarnished by Nifong’s extrajudicial statements to the national news media.  
While the subsequent indictments necessarily damaged the players’ 
reputations, the never-ending interviews granted to various media outlets by 
District Attorney Nifong, and particularly the substance of those interviews, 
helped advance a media firestorm that rivaled the coverage received by the 
O.J. Simpson trial; in essence, the news of the alleged rape, as described and 
depicted by Nifong, made the Duke lacrosse rape case front page news across 
the country and the subject of seemingly endless discussion on cable news 
stations and media websites.
31
  The compelling facts surrounding the evolution 
of the Duke lacrosse case, as chronicled by the national news media, raise an 
important question: in the current media environment, are there adequate 
safeguards in place to protect the reputations of individuals accused of crimes 
by a prosecutor?  While in this case the families of the accused marshalled vast 
resources allowing them to effectively fight, and by most estimations win, a 
media war, the vast majority of Americans accused of crimes do not have the 
ability to do the same.  This Comment shows that while some of the 
reputational protections available to the accused served their purpose in this 
case, in most cases, a person’s reputation is afforded little or no protection. 
The facts surrounding the Duke lacrosse rape investigation provide a 
context to analyze the current legal system’s ability to protect the reputations 
of those who find themselves in a prosecutor’s crosshairs.  The scope of 
discussion is limited to the adequacy of reputational protections available to 
the accused.  The question of whether or not Nifong’s public comments could 
have prevented the Duke lacrosse players from receiving a fair trial does not 
receive in-depth attention.
32
  Although District Attorney Nifong’s conduct, 
 
 29. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF N.C., DURHAM CTY. SUPERIOR CT. CASE FILE NOS. 06 
CRS 4332-4336, 5582-5583, SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 21 (2007) [hereinafter OFFICE OF 
ATT’Y GEN., SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS], available at http://www.ncdoj.com/ 
DocumentStreamerClient?directory=PressReleases/&file=SummaryConclusions.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Stancill, supra note 13, at 1B, 4B. 
 32. Although this Comment does not analyze whether the prosecutor’s extrajudicial 
comments would materially prejudice the court proceeding, a discussion of Rule 3.8 necessarily 
involves interpreting portions of Rule 3.6 because Rule 3.8 purports to supplement Rule 3.6 and 
the two Rules use parallel language.  Compare N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2006) 
with N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2006).  Notably, the North Carolina State Bar 
filed an ethics complaint charging Nifong with, among other things, making extrajudicial 
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coupled with the facts revealed since the announcement of the indictments, 
makes it clear that the decision to indict the three lacrosse players was 
erroneous, this Comment does not provide an in-depth exploration of 
prosecutorial discretion or Nifong’s initial decision to prosecute the players.
33
  
Furthermore, this Comment does not explore the various remedies available to 
the falsely accused players for non-reputational damages. 
Part I of this Comment lays out some of the public statements made by 
Nifong and explores the impact of those statements on the reputations of the 
players.  Part II discusses the reputational protections available to the Duke 
lacrosse players, including the relevant North Carolina ethical provisions 
governing extrajudicial statements and the availability and practicality of a 
defamation action against a state prosecutor.  Part III proposes a number of 
solutions that would provide increased protection for the accused. 
I.  NIFONG’S STATEMENTS AND THE IMPACT ON THE REPUTATIONS OF THE 
ACCUSED 
Mike Nifong conducted numerous interviews with both local and national 
media outlets.  While Nifong’s pre-indictment extrajudicial statements 
regarding the Duke lacrosse rape case are too numerous to chronicle in their 
entirety, the following sections document some of Nifong’s more egregious 
statements and the impact these statements had on the reputations of the three 
accused lacrosse players. 
A. Nifong’s Pre-Indictment Extrajudicial Statements 
In order to fully understand the significance of Nifong’s statements, one 
must first understand the context in which they were made.  The alleged rape 
was said to have occurred at a party, hosted by the Duke lacrosse team, which 
began on the evening of March 13, 2006, and ran into the early morning hours 
 
statements that materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding.  Amended Complaint paras. 178–
81, North Carolina State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing 
Comm’n of N.C. Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].  Moreover, U.S. 
Representative Walter Jones (R-NC, 3d Dist.) personally requested that then United States 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales investigate whether Nifong violated the charged Duke 
lacrosse players’ civil rights.  Rep. Walter Jones Wants Probe of District Attorney Nifong 
Handling Duke Rape Case, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,236106,00.html. 
 33. In late December 2006, the rape charges against the three lacrosse players were dropped 
because the accuser was “no longer certain intercourse occurred.”  Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor 
Could be Ousted, supra note 26.   After a full review of the case, the North Carolina Attorney 
General finally dismissed the indictments against the players on April 11, 2007, declaring them 
innocent of all charges that Nifong leveled against them.  OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., SUMMARY OF 
CONCLUSIONS, supra note 29. 
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of March 14.
34
  On March 16, a search warrant was issued, authorizing the 
search of the residence where the party was held and the alleged crimes 
occurred.
35
  Nifong’s first public statements regarding the case appeared to 
come on March 27, a few days after the Durham News & Observer reported 
that members of the lacrosse team were ordered to submit DNA samples as 
part of an ongoing rape investigation.
36
  In the days that followed, Nifong 
granted interviews with local and national news media organizations.
37
  On 
April 17, 2006, the first two players were indicted for the alleged rape.
38
  On 
May 15, 2006, the third and final player was indicted for the rape of the same 
unnamed accuser.
39
 
During the period between March 27 and April 14—before Nifong 
announced the first two indictments—Nifong made numerous extrajudicial 
statements regarding the Duke lacrosse rape case.  On March 29, Nifong 
appeared on The Abrams Report, a nationally televised news program that 
aired daily on the cable news station MSNBC.
40
  In response to host Dan 
Abrams’s question, “Are you convinced there was a rape here?” Nifong 
responded, “I am convinced that there was a rape, yes, sir.”
41
  Nifong 
elaborated that he was so convinced because 
  . . . [t]he circumstances of the case are not suggestive of the alternate 
explanation that has been suggested by some of the members of the situation.  
There is evidence of trauma in the victim’s vaginal area that was noted when 
she was examined by a nurse at the hospital.  And her general demeanor was 
suggestive of the fact that she had been through a traumatic situation.
42
 
In another interview conducted by Dan Abrams on March 31, Nifong again 
commented extensively on the Duke lacrosse rape investigation.
43
  In response 
 
 34. Thomas & Meadows, supra note 8. 
 35. Search Warrant, In re 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. Durham, NC 27701 (N.C. Dist. Ct. Mar. 
16, 2006) [hereinafter Search Warrant], available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/ 
art3/0329061duke1.gif. 
 36. Biesecker et al., supra note 15, at 16A. 
 37. Id.; see also Duke Lacrosse Team Accused of Gang Rape, supra note 18. 
 38. Indictment, State v. Collin Finnerty, No. 06 CRS 4331 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2006); 
Indictment, State v. Reade William Seligmann, No. 06 CRS 4334 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 
2006). 
 39. Benjamin Niolet et al., Duke Player Indicted; Says All 3 Are Innocent, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, May 16, 2006, at 1A. 
 40. Duke Lacrosse Team Accused of Gang Rape, supra note 18. 
 41. Id.; Amended Complaint, supra note 32, para. 84; Motion to Dismiss and Answer para. 
84, North Carolina State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHS 35 (Disciplinary Hearing 
Comm’n of N.C. Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss and Answer]. 
 42. Duke Lacrosse Team Accused of Gang Rape, supra note 18; see also Amended 
Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 56, 131; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, paras. 
56, 131. 
 43. The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
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to a question in which Abrams asked Nifong whether “some of these people 
have not been cooperative,” Nifong, after asserting that they were cooperative 
in terms of giving “suspect kits,” a list of others at the party, and written 
statements, went on to say, “Now, if they made statements that were not 
true . . . that would not be cooperative.”
44
  In a follow-up to that answer, 
Nifong said, “they denied that a sexual assault took place . . . and the position 
that the state is taking is that that is not a true statement.”
45
  He went on to say 
that “none of the other members of the team, other than [the three players who 
rented the house where the party took place] have made statements to the 
police.”
46
 
After previously mentioning, “This was not a consensual sex situation.  
This was a struggle, wherein [the alleged victim] was struggling just to be able 
to breathe,”
47
 Nifong went on to describe, and even gesture on national 
television, the details of the alleged rape, saying, “the evidence that she would 
present . . . is that she was grabbed from behind.  So that in essence, somebody 
had an arm around her like this, which she then had to struggle with in order to 
be able to breathe, and it was in the course of that struggle that [her] 
fingernails—the artificial fingernails broke off.”
48
  Nifong then stated that he 
expected to make a decision as to whether charges would be filed no sooner 
“than two weeks from today.”
49
   
On more than one occasion, Nifong highlighted the racial aspect of the 
alleged rape.  On March 29, Nifong was quoted in an article published on 
ABCNews.com as saying, “The circumstances of the rape indicated a deep 
racial motivation for some of the things that were done.  It makes a crime that 
is by its nature one of the most offensive and invasive even more so.”
50
  In a 
television interview a day later, Nifong said, “I still think that the racial slurs 
that were involved are relevant to show the mind-set, I guess, that was 
involved in this particular attack, and obviously, to make what is already an 
extremely reprehensible attack even more reprehensible.”
51
  In comments 
given to the News & Observer on March 28, Nifong stated: 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The Abrams Report, supra note 9; Biesecker et al., supra note 15, at 16A (noting 
Nifong’s demonstration). 
 49. The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
 50. Amended Complaint, supra note 32, para. 154; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra 
note 41, para. 154; Ahuja, supra note 19. 
 51. Biesecker et al., supra note 15, at 16A (quoting Nifong’s comments during an interview 
with Harry Smith of CBS’s The Early Show on March 30, 2006).  See also Amended Complaint, 
supra note 32, paras. 160, 163; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, paras. 160, 163. 
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I would like to think that somebody who was not in the bathroom has the 
human decency to call up and say, “What am I doing covering up for a bunch 
of hooligans?”  I’d like to be able to think that there were some people in that 
house that were not involved in this and were as horrified by it as the rest of us 
are.
52
 
It is important to note that the above statements are merely a representative 
sample of Nifong’s damaging statements during the first few weeks the story 
broke.
53
  Nifong granted interviews to scores of local and nationally distributed 
print and television outlets.
54
 The media disseminated the statements 
worldwide on television, in the newspaper, and on the Internet.
55
 
B. The Impact on the Indicted Players’ Reputations 
This “fiasco” severely damaged the reputations of the three indicted Duke 
lacrosse players.
56
  Although such a conclusion is easy to reach, it is difficult to 
pinpoint the source of the harm: was the damage caused by the indictment 
itself or the numerous press interviews Nifong granted during the early stages 
of the case?  While it is certain that Nifong’s decision to indict the players 
harmed their reputations, his numerous discussions with the media, as well as 
the substance of the discussions, magnified the damage to the reputations of 
the three indicted players. 
To appreciate the volume of media attention given to this case, consider 
the following.  Before these accusations became the subject of a media 
firestorm, the names Collin Finnerty, Reade Seligmann, and Dave Evans meant 
nothing to most Americans.  In fact, a Google search of the names would most 
likely have turned up nothing more than their picture and athletic profile from 
the Duke lacrosse website, along with any high school sports coverage they 
may have received by their hometown media.  Today, however, the names of 
the three players are forever associated with the word “rape.”  Searches in the 
Westlaw “All News” database using the terms “Duke,” “rape,” “lacrosse,” and 
each player’s last name revealed an astonishing number of articles.  As of 
 
 52. Biesecker et al., supra note 15, at 16A (quoting Nifong’s March 28, 2006, comments to 
the News & Observer); see also Amended Complaint, supra note 32, para. 137; Motion to 
Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, para. 137. 
 53. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 32; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra 
note 41. 
 54. See Julia Lewis, Journalists Discuss Media’s Coverage of Duke Lacrosse Rape Case, 
WRAL.COM, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1087983. 
 55. Bradley, supra note 8; see also Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order of Discipline paras. 19, 31, 39, North Carolina State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHS 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of N.C. July 24, 2007) [hereinafter Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline]. 
 56. Transcript of Hearing at 16–22, North Carolina State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of N.C. June 16, 2007) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE—A PUBLIC BRANDING 677 
January 10, 2007, 845 news pieces contained the above terms associated with 
the name Evans, 1,234 news pieces contained the above terms and the name 
Finnerty, and 1,310 news pieces contained the above terms and the name 
Seligmann.
57
  Between the dates of Nifong’s first interview on March 27, 
2006, and the indictments of the first two players on April 17, 2006—the 
period when Nifong gave his initial version of the events without any notable 
retort by defense attorneys—963 news pieces contained the terms “Duke,” 
“lacrosse,” and “rape” in the same sentence.
58
  Again, that is 963 print news 
pieces stored in this database alone during a twenty-two day period.  
Furthermore, an October 20, 2006, a news piece—printed nearly seven months 
after the story broke—stated that Duke University estimated that there were 
“nearly 75,000 stories done on the lacrosse case.”
59
  The sheer volume of news 
pieces during the above periods shows the ubiquity of the media coverage. 
Clearly, this reportage shaped the reputations of the indicted players in the 
minds of the public.  “Reputation” is defined as “[t]he esteem in which a 
person is held by others.”
60
  In essence, the status of one’s reputation depends 
upon the perception of others.  Our perceptions of strangers are heavily 
influenced by the depiction of the individuals in the news media and the 
opinions and actions of those who seem to have access to “the facts.”  In this 
case, Nifong’s pre-indictment statements were particularly harmful to the 
reputations of the accused because Nifong is a public official whom the public 
assumes is familiar with, and has special access to, the facts that led to the 
indictment; the prosecutor is in a unique position that makes him appear to be a 
particularly trustworthy source of information.
61
  This apparently trustworthy 
source expressed with absolute certainty that these crimes not only occurred, 
but were racially motivated.
62
  Consequently, when Nifong made the 
statements, some of which are detailed above, the public and the media alike 
gave the statements significant weight when forming their opinions and 
framing their coverage of the players.
63
 
 
 57. Finnerty, Seligmann & Evans, Westlaw searches (Jan. 10, 2007) (on file with author). 
 58. Pre-indictment Westlaw search (Jan 10, 2007) (on file with author). 
 59. Lewis, supra note 54. 
 60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (8th ed. 2004). 
 61. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6 (2006); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 
501 U.S. 1030, 1074–75 (1991); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 
548, 559 (Md. 2003). 
 62. See Gary L. Wright, Lawyer: Try to Imagine the Pain, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 27, 
2007, at 1B, 2B. 
 63. An ironic illustration of the proposition that the media and the public give great weight 
to the assertions of those with access to the facts is found in commentary regarding the ethics 
complaint filed against Nifong.  In discussing the severity of the ethics charges filed against 
Nifong, Rufus Edmisten, a former Attorney General of North Carolina, used the preliminary 
actions of the State Bar as evidence that a violation had occurred, stating “[w]hen you have a 
conservative organization like the North Carolina State Bar alleging that someone got up to the 
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Furthermore, the timing of Nifong’s public comments was particularly 
harmful to the reputations of the accused.  Nifong’s interviews, which drove 
the media coverage, came at a time when there were no indictments or suspects 
identified by name, although Nifong did indicate that he believed lacrosse 
players were the perpetrators.
64
  Consequently, while Nifong was espousing his 
version of the facts, and sometimes potential facts,
65
 no one was in position to 
rebut his assertions.  Thus, much of what he said to the media went 
unchallenged and was accepted as fact.  Because Nifong made his public 
comments regarding those who would later be indicted before they were 
identified, the media presented a one-sided view of the alleged incident that 
went largely unchallenged by advocates from the other side.
66
  Some may 
argue that the reputations of the players were damaged by the indictment and 
therefore the prosecutor’s comments are irrelevant vis-à-vis their reputations.  
This argument, however, fails to consider that one’s reputation has multiple 
components.  The obvious component is how others perceive the individuals in 
question.  Another component is the number of people aware of the 
information that negatively impacted their reputations.  While an indictment 
necessarily harms an individual’s reputation, it is a one-time, or in this case 
two-time, event that causes a spike in media coverage that soon dies down 
until new developments to report or discuss arise. 
In this case, however, Nifong granted interview after interview with 
numerous press organizations, which created an atmosphere with new 
developments each day, and sometimes each hour.  By granting, by some 
estimates, over fifty interviews in the first few days after the incident garnered 
public attention, Nifong was essentially creating news by answering the 
reporters’ questions.
67
  His continuous flow of statements, which sometimes 
contained pure speculation about what “may” have happened, gave print and 
television news new material that allowed them to rehash the lurid details of 
the incident over and over again.
68
  If Nifong refused to grant the numerous 
interviews and refrained from speculating about details that had yet to be fully 
investigated, the media coverage would have been more subdued, and 
 
line and crossed over the line, it’s pretty strong evidence that something occurred that should not 
have occurred.”  Jim Avila & Lara Setrakian, The Prosecutor’s Defense—Lawyer for Ex-Duke 
Prosecutor Nifong Speaks Out, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 25, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
LegalCenter/story?id=2821711. 
 64. See The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Wright, supra note 62, at 2B (“There is little question that, fueled by the district 
attorney’s comments and focused on the theme of ‘privileged white males vs. poor black female,’ 
a feeding frenzy developed among the media with one commentator after another competing to 
outdo each other in their condemnation [of the accused].”). 
 67. Niolet & Blythe, supra note 14. 
 68. See The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
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therefore, fewer individuals would be aware of the damaging information.  If a 
smaller amount of the public at large was aware of the damaging information, 
the damage to the reputations of the players would be less severe.  In summary, 
Nifong made numerous statements to the press in the early days of the 
investigation in which he expressed certainty that a rape had occurred and 
indicated the perpetrator was a Duke lacrosse player.  He made other 
statements describing and sometimes speculating as to how the alleged attack 
occurred.  Nifong also highlighted the racial aspects of the case.  These 
statements prompted frenzied media coverage, giving the media new news to 
report with each interview and speculative comment.  While the indictment 
harmed the reputations of the indicted individuals, Nifong’s repeated 
comments were the driving force behind the continuous airplay of the story.  
The continuous coverage resulted in more people hearing about the alleged 
horrific acts and thus compounded the reputational damage to the three 
accused of rape. 
II.  POTENTIAL REPUTATIONAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED 
Since Mike Nifong’s public comments caused extensive damage to the 
reputations of the indicted players, the next question is what recourse is 
available to these players and other individuals victimized by a prosecutor’s 
improper extrajudicial statements?  This discussion of the available remedies is 
limited to those that provide recourse for the reputational damage sustained.  
This Part discusses the relevant provisions of the North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct and their applicability to Nifong’s extrajudicial 
statements, as well as the ability of these provisions to remedy damage 
inflicted by a prosecutor’s impermissible extrajudicial statements.  This Part 
also addresses the issues regarding a defamation suit individuals may want to 
bring against a prosecutor who makes damaging public statements aimed at 
those accused of notorious crimes. 
A. North Carolina’s Rules of Professional Conduct 
On December 28, 2006, the North Carolina State Bar filed an ethics 
complaint against Mike Nifong, alleging that many of the above statements, 
along with others cited in the complaint, which was subsequently amended on 
January 24, 2007, were made in violation of North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rules 3.6(a) and 3.8(f).
69
  On July 24, 2007, the North 
Carolina State Bar found that Mike Nifong had, among other things, violated 
Rule 3.8(f) and determined that Nifong should be disbarred for his numerous 
 
 69. Amended Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 178–81.  Nifong was also charged with 
violating other provisions of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.  Id. para. 291. 
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violations of various North Carolina ethics provisions.
70
  This section briefly 
examines the First Amendment issues that arise when regulating a lawyer’s 
speech, then applies the relevant portions of Rule 3.8 of North Carolina’s 
Rules of Professional Conduct to Nifong’s statements.
71
  Next, it examines 
whether a finding that a prosecutor violated ethics rules is a viable reputational 
remedy.  Lastly, this section explores a specific provision of Rule 3.6 that 
could potentially provide significant protection to the accused. 
1. Does the State Have the Power to Regulate a Lawyer’s Speech? 
As a preliminary matter, the question of whether a prosecutor’s statements 
are protected by the First Amendment must be resolved.  The Supreme Court 
addressed that question in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.
72
  In Gentile, the 
Court recognized the state’s right, under certain circumstances, to regulate 
lawyer speech both inside and outside the courtroom.
73
  However, when a 
state’s regulation implicates First Amendment concerns, the attorney’s rights 
must be weighed against the state’s legitimate interest in limiting the speech; in 
this case, the state has an interest in protecting the fundamental right “to a fair 
trial by ‘impartial’ jurors.”
74
 
The ethics rule at issue in Gentile allowed the state to limit the speech of 
an attorney where there was a “substantial likelihood that his statements would 
materially prejudice the trial of his client.”
75
  The Court determined that the 
“substantial likelihood” test is a constitutionally permissible standard for 
balancing the attorney’s First Amendment right with the state’s interest in 
“protect[ing] the integrity and fairness of [the] State’s judicial system” because 
“it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech.”
76
 
The limitation is sufficiently narrow because it applies only to speech that 
is substantially likely to materially prejudice the proceedings, it applies equally 
 
 70. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
para. 117, at 20, 24. 
 71. Although the North Carolina State Bar found that Nifong did in fact violate Rule 3.8(f), 
they did not provide an in-depth analysis.  Id. para. 117, at 20. 
 72. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 73. Id. at 1071–73.  Specifically, the Court noted that in the courtroom, it is 
“unquestionable” that an attorney’s right to free speech is “extremely circumscribed.”  Id. at 
1071.  With respect to regulating speech outside the courtroom, the Court cited decisions where 
ethics regulations prohibiting lawyers from soliciting business and advertising were not defeated 
by the First Amendment.  Id. at 1073; see, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 
(1995) (upholding thirty day ban of solicitation letters by personal injury lawyers); Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding prohibition on in-person solicitations 
by an attorney). 
 74. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. 
 75. Id. at 1062. 
 76. Id. at 1075. 
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to both sides, and it merely postpones the speech until the end of the trial.
77
  
These limitations focus on two major “evils”: “comments that are likely to 
influence the outcome of the trial” and “comments that are likely to prejudice 
the jury venire . . . .”
78
 Because the rule protects the fundamental right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury and only places narrow limitations on the attorney’s 
right to free speech, the rule is constitutionally permissible.
79
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutors, who are 
employees of the state, do not enjoy the same broad First Amendment 
freedoms as are guaranteed to ordinary citizens.
80
  In an employer-employee 
relationship, “the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of 
its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection 
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”
81
  Thus, prosecutors’ 
status as attorneys, coupled with their employer-employee relationships with 
the state, makes their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech subject to 
curtailment by ethics regulations. 
2. Nifong’s Violation of North Carolina’s Rule 3.8(f) 
When analyzing the Rules of Professional conduct, in North Carolina or 
elsewhere, there are multiple sources that aid with the interpretation of the 
rules.  These sources include, among other things, court decisions that address 
the rules, ethics opinions issued by state bar associations, the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, and any legislative history.
82
  While 
North Carolina cases would be helpful when interpreting the North Carolina 
rules, attorney discipline cases discussing 3.8(f) are rare.
83
  Cases discussing 
provisions resembling North Carolina’s Rule 3.8(f) in other jurisdictions are 
equally rare.
84
  An exhaustive search of ethics opinions and cases in various 
jurisdictions, as well as an examination of the Restatement and the history of 
the development of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility—the 
foundation for North Carolina’s Rule 3.8(f)—revealed little helpful analysis 
 
 77. Id. at 1076. 
 78. Id. at 1075. 
 79. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. 
 80. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 573 n.21 (Md. 
2003) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
 81. Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
 82. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (9th 
ed. 2006). 
 83. 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 20.25 (3d ed. 1999). 
 84. The only case that could be found that discusses, albeit briefly, Rule 3.8(f) is In re 
Gansler, which is a reciprocal discipline case.  889 A.2d 285 (D.C. 2005). 
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regarding Rule 3.8(f).
85
  While the North Carolina State Bar recently found 
that Nifong violated Rule 3.8(f), the published findings do not provide an in-
depth legal analysis; rather, it provides findings of facts and the conclusion that 
Nifong did in fact violate Rule 3.8(f).
86
  Since helpful authority on point is 
rare, this analysis will rely heavily on the rule and the accompanying comment. 
Rule 3.8, which details the special responsibilities of a prosecutor, provides 
in pertinent part: 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
. . . 
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature 
and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a 
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the 
accused . . . .
87
 
Paragraph (f), above, is intended to supplement Rule 3.6, which seeks to 
prohibit extrajudicial statements that have a “substantial likelihood of 
prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.”
88
  This paragraph of the North 
Carolina Rules recognizes that in a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor’s 
statements have an impact on the public’s opinion of the accused.
89
  The 
prosecutor’s position as a public official gives him heightened visibility; thus, 
the prosecutor’s statements are likely to reach a large audience and, depending 
on the nature of the comments, could “increas[e] public opprobrium of the 
accused.”
90
  Although the indictment of a suspect almost certainly brings about 
some level of public condemnation of the accused, the prosecutor should 
temper his or her statements so as to minimize any unfair and unnecessary 
condemnation before the trial.
91
 
 
 85. While it is difficult to prove that little authority exists, a look at Morgan & Rotunda’s 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY textbook highlights the struggle to find authority.  A glance at 
the Table of Statutes shows that MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) was referenced on 
only three pages—482, 487, and 489—in a text book containing over 707 pages of material.  
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 82, at xlvii.  A closer look at the aforementioned referenced 
pages shows the rule is mentioned in a total of four sentences, one of which simply directs the 
reader to “[s]ee Model Rule 3.8(f),” see id. at 482, and two others simply pose questions to the 
reader, id. at 487, 489. 
 86. See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 
55, para. 117, at 20. 
 87. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2006). 
 88. Id. at R. 3.8(f) cmt. 6. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.; see also STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: 
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 253 (2005). 
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Despite the lack of guidance beyond the rule and comment, given the 
inflammatory nature of Nifong’s statements, the North Carolina State Bar 
found that Nifong violated Rule 3.8(f).
92
  Nifong’s statements, highlighted 
above,
93
 certainly heightened the disgrace of the accused in the eyes of the 
public.
94
  While, as the comment following Rule 3.8 predicts, the players 
suffered significant public disgrace from the indictment, Nifong’s colorful 
comments, particularly those which highlighted the racial motivation behind 
the rape, fanned the flames of public outrage.
95
 
The complaint filed by the North Carolina State Bar supports the claim that 
Nifong’s racially charged statements heightened public outrage toward the 
accused.  In the complaint filed by the North Carolina State Bar, the 
organization set forth twelve specific statements that Nifong made that were 
alleged to have violated Rule 3.8(f).
96
  While the statements in violation of 
Rule 3.8(f) are “not limited to” those presented in the complaint, of the 
statements the Bar chose to include, half of the statements contained a 
reference to the racial motivation behind the alleged rape.
97
  In finding that 
Nifong violated Rule 3.8(f), the State Bar specifically noted at least four 
separate racially charged statements Nifong made during the early stages of the 
investigation.
98
 
Nifong significantly added to the public disgust of the indicted Duke 
lacrosse players by continuously highlighting the race issue.  Thankfully, most 
modern societies recognize that racially motivated hatred is deplorable.  In 
fact, many states have codified this recognition by enhancing punishments for 
 
 92. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
para. 117, at 20. 
 93. See supra Part I.B. 
 94. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
para. 117, at 23. 
 95. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) cmt. 6 (2006).  The defense attorney for 
Seligmann noted that the district attorney’s certainty and his insistence that the crime was racially 
motivated were such that “even casual viewers could not help but be outraged.”  Wright, supra 
note 62, at 2B. 
 96. See Amended Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 142–78; see, e.g., supra text 
accompanying notes 50–51. 
 97. Amended Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 142, 145, 151, 154, 160, 175.  It is important 
to note that there were reports of racial slurs being shouted at the dancers as they left the party.  
Samiha Khanna & Anne Blythe, Dancer Gives Details of Ordeal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 25, 
2006, at 1A, 16A.  In fact, the accuser herself told investigators that racial slurs were being used 
during the alleged rape.  Duke Accuser’s Contradictory Statements, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 11, 
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=2787914.  However, because there were 
numerous individuals at the party, and no specific individual was identified as shouting the 
horrific remarks as the women left the party, it is unfair to make the indicted players the face of 
the unidentified racist voice. 
 98. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
paras. 23, 29, 31, 32. 
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crimes that are proven to be racially motivated.
99
  A necessary consequence of 
society’s welcomed recognition, however, is that anyone accused of a racially 
motivated crime is immediately subjected to intense public condemnation, as 
was the case with the Duke lacrosse players, who were the subject of almost 
daily neighborhood protests, which occurred before any indictments were 
issued.
100
  Because these allegations of a racially motivated gang rape were 
communicated to the public via the prosecutor himself, the public all but 
accepted the detailed allegations as true.
101
  Consequently, Nifong’s statements 
provoked unusually vocal and protracted public condemnation to the extent 
rarely seen following similar accusations. 
While the racially charged statements, along with the others mentioned 
above, served to heighten the public condemnation of the accused, the 
statements are not in violation of Rule 3.8(f) if the statements are “necessary to 
inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action” or if they 
“have a legitimate law enforcement purpose.”
102
  The exceptions in Rule 3.8(f) 
seem to be broad descriptions of the specific safe harbor provision articulated 
in Rule 3.6(b).
103
  Because many, if not all, of the specifically permitted 
statements in 3.6(b) seem to fall under the broad heading of either statements 
“necessary to inform the public of the nature . . . of the prosecutor’s action” or 
statements that “serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose,”
104
 and the 
comment following Rule 3.8 specifically states that the rule is not intended to 
limit the prosecutor from making any of the statements permitted in the safe 
harbor provision in 3.6(b),
105
 the applicable provisions of 3.6(b) provide 
guidance as to what type of statements fall under the categorical exceptions 
listed in Rule 3.8(f). 
 
 99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-3 (2005).  Which instance Nifong was referring to 
during his public statements—either the slurs used during the rape or the media reports of the 
slurs being used when the dancers left the house—is considered below.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 131–41. 
 100. Wright, supra note 62, at 16A; Two Duke Players Indicted by Grand Jury, 
MSNBC.COM, Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12289760. 
 101. See 60 Minutes Interview with President Brodhead, DUKE UNIVERSITY NEWS & 
COMMUNICATIONS, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2006/12/60_minutes.html.  
Referring to statements made by Nifong early in the investigation, Duke President Richard 
Brodhead said, “Well, at the time the statements were made, I had no way of knowing anything 
other than the fact that they must be true . . . .  [T]hat helped to create the climate at the beginning 
in which an awful lot of people were absolutely certain that these kids had done this deed.”  Id. 
 102. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2006). 
 103. See id. R. 3.6(b). 
 104. See id. R. 3.6(b), 3.8(f). 
 105. See id. R. 3.8(f) cmt. 6. 
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Rule 3.6, which governs trial publicity, provides in pertinent part: 
(b)  Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state: 
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited 
by law, the identity of the persons involved; 
(2) the information contained in a public record; 
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; 
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; 
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information 
necessary thereto; 
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, 
when there is a reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of a 
substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and 
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): 
(A) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the 
accused; 
(B) if the accused has not been apprehended, information 
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; 
(C) the fact, time and place of arrest; and 
(D) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies 
and the length of the investigation.
106
 
Nifong’s statements do not fall within any of the safe harbor provisions 
listed in Rule 3.6(b).  While the statements listed in the safe harbor provision 
are “not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a 
lawyer may make a statement,”
107
 they provide a good idea as to what the 
North Carolina Bar considers permissible public commentary on an ongoing 
judicial proceeding. 
As a starting point, the first safe harbor provisions considered will be those 
Nifong himself believes shield him from a finding of wrongdoing.  During a 
news conference in July of 2006, Nifong is reported to have explained that his 
 
 106. Id. R. 3.6.  As an illustration of the above contention that most of the statements 
permitted in Rule 3.6(b) fall within the broad headings of statements that are necessary to inform 
the public of the prosecutor’s action and statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose, consider the following breakdown: statements necessary to inform the public of the 
prosecutor’s actions are excepted in R. 3.6(b)(1), (3), (4), (7)(C), (7)(D); and statements that serve 
a legitimate law enforcement purpose are excepted in R. 3.6(b)(5), (6), (7)(A), (7)(B). 
 107. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 4 (2006). 
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public comments were intended to “inform the public that an investigation was 
in progress and to encourage cooperation from witnesses,” apparently referring 
to Rule 3.6, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(5), respectively.
108
  In Nifong’s Motion 
to Dismiss and Answer to the Complaint filed against him by the State Bar, he 
claimed that he was attempting to “reassure the community that the case was 
being actively investigated” and “obtain assistance in receiving evidence and 
information necessary to further the criminal investigation.”
109
  While anyone 
who read or heard Nifong’s statements could gather that an investigation was 
in progress, Nifong’s statements went well beyond the bounds of the safe 
harbor by speculating as to the details of the rape, the racial aspect of the rape, 
and on and on.
110
  Not only did he inform the public that an investigation was 
ongoing, he gave a prediction, expressed with absolute certainty, as to how it 
would conclude.
111
  Moreover, while Nifong may have thought his statements 
would encourage cooperation, publicly branding the lacrosse players “a bunch 
of hooligans” who were ignoring a rape just to protect one of their own must, 
by any reasonable interpretation, be deemed to have gone beyond the scope of 
permissible commentary, as contemplated by the safe harbor provision.
112
 
Even if some of Nifong’s statements were deemed to fall within the safe 
harbor allowing a prosecutor to elicit cooperation of witnesses, many would 
not.
113
  Nifong would be hard pressed to explain how his detailed speculation 
as to how the rape may have occurred, his explanation of how the absence of 
physical evidence could be explained away, his highlighting of the racial 
aspect of the attack, and his implication that the subjects of the investigation 
were lying to the police could accomplish such a goal in a manner consistent 
with the Rule.
114
  Even if Nifong was trying to convince witnesses to come 
forward and provide information, as he claimed, the safe harbor does not 
sanction the use of any tactics the prosecutor deems necessary to accomplish 
such a goal.  For example, Comment 5 following Rule 3.6 gives examples of 
some statements by a prosecutor that are more likely than not to violate Rule 
3.6.
115
  One such statement would be a prosecutor’s public expression of “any 
 
 108. Joseph Neff, Anne Blythe & Benjamin Niolet, DA’s Critics Ask Bar, Feds to Intervene, 
NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 3, 2006, at 1A, 8A. 
 109. Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, para. 10. 
 110. See supra, Part I.A. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 113. Nifong’s defense that he was encouraging the cooperation of witnesses as permitted 
under Rule 3.6(b)(5) and the potential defense that, in a criminal case, the prosecutor may make 
statements necessary to “aid in the apprehension” of the accused under Rule 3.6(b)(7)(B) are so 
similar that both are negated in the same analysis.  See supra note 108. 
 114. See supra Part I.A. 
 115. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (2006). 
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opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant.”
116
  While the prosecutor’s 
public declaration of his opinion of the suspect’s guilt would go a long way to 
securing witnesses to come forward and provide evidence to secure a 
conviction against the suspect, the comment following the rule cites such a 
statement as an example of a likely violation of the rule: a recognition that the 
safe harbor does not cover any statement, so long as it was intended to 
accomplish the goal of obtaining assistance in securing evidence.  Thus, many 
of Nifong’s statements, as outlined above, would not fall under the safe harbor 
provision allowing an attorney to obtain assistance in gathering information 
about the crime, just because Nifong claims that was the desired result of his 
comments.  The North Carolina State Bar recognized that Nifong’s comments 
did not fall within the aforementioned safe harbors by finding that he violated 
Rule 3.8(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Nifong further defended himself by claiming that his public statements 
concerned information contained in a public record and are thus protected by 
the safe harbor provision of Rule 3.6.
117
  While there are no North Carolina 
cases discussing the public record exception in Rule 3.6, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland discussed a similar exception found in the Maryland Rules of 
Professional Conduct.
118
  In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. 
Gansler, the court determined that there was no settled definition of 
“information contained in a public record” because of the widely disparate 
meanings given to the phrase in various Maryland statutes.
119
  Because there 
was no clear guidance as to what was “information in a public record” before 
the Gansler case, the court gave the phrase “its broadest form” for the purposes 
of evaluating Gansler’s statements.
120
  The court’s broad interpretation defined 
“information contained in a public record” as “anything in the public domain, 
including public court documents, media reports, and comments made by 
police officers.”
121
  However, going forward, the court significantly narrowed 
the definition by limiting “information in a public record” to “public 
government records—the records and papers on file with a government entity 
to which an ordinary citizen would have lawful access.”
122
 
In North Carolina, it is difficult to say whether there is a settled definition 
of “information in a public record.”  Chapter 132 of North Carolina’s General 
Statutes, titled “Public Records,” defines public records as “all documents . . . 
made or received pursuant to law . . . in connection with the transaction of 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. R. 3.6(b)(2); Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, para. 10. 
 118. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 559 (Md. 2003). 
 119. Id. at 566–67. 
 120. Id. at 567. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 569. 
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public business by any agency of North Carolina government.”
123
  While this 
definition seems to be more in line with the narrower interpretation given by 
the Maryland Court of Appeals, because there is no authority specifically 
addressing the language in Rule 3.6 in North Carolina, Nifong will receive the 
benefit of the broader definition for the purpose of this analysis. 
Even if Nifong is given the protection of the broad definition of 
“information in a public record,” his most damaging comments are not 
protected by the safe harbor provision.  At the time Nifong made his 
statements, the public record included any information reported by the media 
regarding the case, the search warrant authorizing the Durham Police to search 
the residence where the alleged rape occurred, and the Nontestimonial 
Identification Order (NTO), which provided the basis for the gathering of 
DNA from the Duke lacrosse players.
124
  While the public record safe harbor 
typically provides an exception “big enough to drive a tractor trailer through” 
because the prosecutor can include great detail concerning the crime in the 
indictment—a document that is part of the public record—since Nifong’s 
comments came before an indictment was issued, this exception provides 
considerably less protection.
125
 
The contents of the search warrant and NTO are insufficient to place 
Nifong’s comments under the umbrella of the public records exception.  The 
search warrant contains a brief description of the alleged rape.
126
  This 
description does not contain any references to race or a racial motivation 
behind the attack.
127
  In fact, after reading the warrant, it is impossible to tell 
the racial makeup of either the alleged attackers or the victim.
128
  Therefore, 
since the search warrant does not contain any reference to race, let alone the 
conclusion that the attack was racially motivated, the contents of the search 
warrant are insufficient to place Nifong under the protection of the public 
record safe harbor.  While the NTO contains a more detailed description of the 
alleged attack and it references the accuser as a “black female” and the 
attackers as “white male[s],” there is no indication, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that this alleged attack was motivated by race.
129
  Because there is 
 
 123. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1 (2006). 
 124. See Search Warrant, supra note 35; Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order 
(N.C. Super. Ct., Mar. 23, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nontestimonial Identification 
Order].  At the time of Nifong’s initial statements, these were the only court filings that contained 
specific information relating to the alleged attack. 
 125. 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83; see also supra notes 14, 38 and accompanying 
text (Nifong made his first public comments on March 27, 2006, and issued the first indictments 
on April 17, 2006). 
 126. Search Warrant, supra note 35, at 4. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Nontestimonial Identification Order, supra note 124. 
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no reference to a racial motivation behind the alleged attack in either the search 
warrant or the NTO, neither of the publicly filed documents provide the basis 
for Nifong’s claim that his statements regarding the racial motivation behind 
the rape, which happened to be among the most damaging to the reputations of 
the accused, were protected by the public record exception.
130
 
The contents of the various media reports are likewise insufficient to grant 
Nifong the protection of the public record safe harbor.  Although there were 
media reports that some unidentified individual or individuals made racial slurs 
as the women exited the house on the night in question, Nifong’s comments 
were so expansive that they should not be shielded by the safe harbor.  On 
March 25, 2006, a few days before Nifong’s first comments, one media outlet 
reported that a neighbor recalled “one guy” yelled “[t]hank your grandpa for 
my cotton shirt . . . .”
131
  Other media outlets played a 9-1-1 call during which 
someone reported that “there’s . . . a white guy” who shouted a racial slur.
132
  
If Nifong made comments along the lines of, “some of the people at the house 
shouted racial epithets, which is deplorable conduct” or “such use of hateful 
language by someone at that house is conduct that should be condemned by 
all,” the safe harbor would clearly apply because the comments would be 
discussing information already available to the public.
133
 
Nifong’s statements went well beyond discussing what was in the public 
record by commenting on the supposed racial hatred involved in the alleged 
rape itself.  As noted above, the media reported that someone shouted racial 
epithets from the house.  The individual was never identified and there were, 
by Nifong’s estimation, over forty people at the party.
134
  Nifong’s public 
comments referred to the racial aspect of the rape, not the comments made by 
an unidentified partygoer.
135
  The racial aspect of the alleged rape that Nifong 
was referring to becomes abundantly clear when one reads a police 
investigator’s account of the accuser’s statement given on March 16, 2006, 
over a week before Nifong made his first public statements regarding the 
case.
136
  The accuser told the investigator that the three men who raped her 
“were all chanting or repeatedly saying ‘fuck this nigger bitch.’”
137
  It is this 
account by the accuser, which identifies the alleged rapists as using the slurs 
 
 130. See Motion to Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, para. 10. 
 131. Khanna & Blythe, supra note 97, at 16A.  To ensure there is no misunderstanding, the 
Author personally condemns the use of such horrific language.  The idea that some people in this 
country still harbor such hateful feelings toward others is pathetic and unfortunate. 
 132. The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
 133. See N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)(2) (2006). 
 134. The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
 135. See Amended Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 151–75; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, 
supra note 41, paras. 151–75. 
 136. See Duke Accuser’s Contradictory Statements, supra note 97. 
 137. Id. 
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during the attack, which would lead Nifong to conclude that “[t]he 
circumstances of the rape indicated a deep racial motivation for some of the 
things that were done” or that “[t]he racial slurs involved are relevant to show 
the mindset . . . involved in this particular attack.”
138
  The accuser’s statement, 
given to the police investigator on March 16, had not been revealed to the 
media when Nifong made the public statements highlighting the racial 
motivation behind the alleged attack.
139
  Therefore, because Nifong made the 
statements regarding the racial aspect of the rape during media interviews, and 
this information was not part of the public record, the statements are not 
protected by the public record safe harbor in Rule 3.6(b). 
Lastly, Nifong could have argued that his statements were really meant to 
warn the community of the danger posed to them by those involved in this 
attack, thereby giving him the protection of Rule 3.6(b)(6).
140
  This argument 
would have certainly failed.  A survey of some of the interviews granted by 
Nifong and the scores of media accounts of these interviews shows that a 
warning to the community is conspicuously absent.  If Nifong intended to warn 
the community of a significant danger posed to it, one would think he would 
have actually communicated some sort of warning during his statements.  
Furthermore, at the time Nifong made many of the statements, he had not yet 
specifically identified any suspects; rather, he communicated that the suspects 
were forty or so Duke lacrosse players that attended the party.
141
  Given the 
substance of Nifong’s interviews, he would have a difficult time convincing 
the State Bar that he was intending to warn the public of a small group of 
possibly dangerous individuals, whose identities had yet to be ascertained. 
Since most of Nifong’s extrajudicial statements are not protected by the 
safe harbor in Rule 3.6, they should also be deemed to fall outside the 
exceptions found in 3.8(f): statements necessary to inform the public of the 
prosecutor’s actions and statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose.
142
  The exceptions in 3.8(f) are broad categorical exceptions, and the 
safe harbor in 3.6 contains many permissible statements, which seem to be 
examples of statements or the type of statements that are permissible under the 
exceptions outlined in Rule 3.8.  Using the safe harbor in Rule 3.6 to analyze 
the exceptions in 3.8(f) may be creative, but it is the best authority available 
 
 138. Amended Complaint, supra note 32, at paras. 154, 160; Motion to Dismiss and Answer, 
supra note 41, paras. 154, 160. 
 139. Nifong uttered the above quoted statements in March of 2006, Amended Complaint, 
supra note 32, paras. 156, 162, or as late as April 3, 2006, according to Nifong, Motion to 
Dismiss and Answer, supra note 41, paras. 156, 162. 
 140. It does not appear that he actually made this argument.  See Motion to Dismiss and 
Answer, supra note 41. 
 141. The Abrams Report, supra note 9. 
 142. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2006). 
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given the dearth of material discussing Rule 3.8(f).
143
  Furthermore, since Rule 
3.8 contains the phrase “special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” the comment 
following Rule 3.8 states that paragraph (f) is meant to supplement Rule 3.6, 
and the comment states that Rule 3.8(f) is not meant to limit the safe harbor’s 
scope, there is certainly a close relationship between the two rules.
144
  Because 
Nifong’s statements heightened the public condemnation of the accused and 
they did not fall within the safe harbor in Rule 3.6—and thus should not be 
covered by the exceptions in 3.8(f)—Nifong’s extrajudicial statements are a 
violation of Rule 3.8 of North Carolina’s Rules of Professional Conduct.
145
 
3. How Is a Violation of This Rule a Cure for Reputational Damage? 
Under certain circumstances, violations of ethics rules provide a 
reputational remedy in the form of positive publicity.  Generally, when the 
North Carolina State Bar files an ethics complaint against a prosecutor, it calls 
the prosecutor’s credibility into question.  By filing the complaint, the bar in 
essence communicates to the public that the prosecutor has not played by the 
rules.
146
  Ideally, the media will publicize the complaint and the ultimate 
findings.  This negative publicity calls into question the prosecutor’s reliability 
as a trustworthy source, thereby causing the citizenry, who relied on his 
statements and actions when forming their opinion as to the guilt of the 
accused,
147
 to question the legitimacy of that position.  If the complaint or 
ultimate finding causes the public to view the prosecutor as corrupt or driven 
by a motive other than the pursuit of justice, the public will likely question the 
legitimacy of the entire proceeding, thereby supporting the accused rather than 
the prosecutor.
148
 
In the current case, the State Bar’s decision to file an ethics complaint 
against Nifong, and the disciplinary commission’s ultimate decision to disbar 
Nifong, called the prosecutor’s credibility into question and resulted in 
favorable publicity for the accused.  The news of the filing of the ethics 
 
 143. Even the findings of fact and conclusions of law published by the disciplinary 
commission do not contain any meaningful analysis.  See Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55. 
 144. See N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) cmt. 6. 
 145. See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 
55, para. 117, at 20. 
 146. See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 32 (alleging violations of multiple North 
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 148. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 17 (North Carolina Disciplinary Commission 
finding that it could “draw no other conclusion but that [the] initial statements that [Nifong] made 
were to further his political ambition”). 
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complaint against Nifong was reported extensively.
149
  Many of these reports 
recounted the charges against Nifong, which included the violation of multiple 
North Carolina ethics provisions.
150
  The State Bar accused Nifong of making 
statements that materially prejudiced an adjudicative proceeding; making 
statements that heightened the public condemnation of the accused; engaging 
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and withholding 
exculpatory evidence from the defense.
151
  Likewise, the finding that Nifong 
violated the ethics rules and his subsequent disbarment were also widely 
reported.
152
  Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the 
rehabilitative impact of these charges and Nifong’s eventual disbarment on the 
reputations of the accused, especially given the indicted players’ positive 
publicity proceeding the ethics complaint, it is certain that these highly 
publicized charges and Nifong’s disbarment called his credibility into question, 
causing the public to doubt his version of the events and ultimately his decision 
to pursue charges at the outset.
153
 
While the ethics complaint filed against Nifong and the disciplinary 
commission’s ultimate findings were a reputational remedy for the players in 
this case, the adequacy of the remedy for those defamed by a prosecutor 
depends on many factors, which although present in the Duke lacrosse rape 
case, are unlikely to be present in others.
154
  These factors concern the distinct 
roles played by the public, the media, and the State Bar in facilitating the 
remedial aspect of the ethics complaint.  First, in order to serve as a 
reputational remedy, the filing of an ethics complaint must be timely so the 
public associates the prosecutor’s statements with his unethical conduct.  If an 
ethics complaint by the State Bar is going to counteract any reputational 
damage caused by a prosecutor’s impermissible extrajudicial statements, the 
complaint must be filed while the public remains engaged.  If the public is not 
 
 149. Wright, supra note 62, at 2B; Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Could be Ousted, supra note 
26; see, e.g., Avila & Setrakian, supra note 63. 
 150. See supra note 149. 
 151. Amended Complaint, supra note 32, para. 291; Former Duke Lacrosse ‘Rape’ 
Prosecutor Charged With Withholding Evidence, Misleading Court, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 24, 
2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,246281,00.html. 
 152. See, e.g., Dan Hart, Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred in Ethics Case, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 16, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid= 
aW9bAiVpto.8&refer=us; Mike Nifong Disbarred Over Ethics Violations in Duke Lacrosse Case, 
FOXNEWS.COM, June 17, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,283282,00.html; Lara 
Setrakian & Chris Fransescani, Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred, ABCNEWS.COM, 
June 16, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862. 
 153. Former Duke Lacrosse ‘Rape’ Prosecutor Charged With Withholding Evidence, 
Misleading Court, supra note 151. 
 154. These “factors” are derived from my observations of the media and discussions with 
Professor John C. O’Brien, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
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attentive to the controversy, particularly to the doubt cast upon the prosecutor, 
the community will maintain its negative view of the accused. 
Although an ethics complaint was filed in the Duke lacrosse rape case 
before the trial began when public interest remained high, ethics complaints 
are not typically filed during an ongoing criminal proceeding.
155
  In fact, the 
disciplinary commission stated that it was “unprecedented that the State Bar 
would take disciplinary action against a prosecutor during the pendency of the 
case . . . .”
156
  The State Bar commonly postpones filing an ethics complaint 
because if filed during an ongoing proceeding, the accusation may hinder the 
attorney’s ability to represent the client.
157
  This is especially true when a 
prosecutor is involved, for it creates a serious conflict of interest: does the 
prosecutor pursue the case in search of justice or does he pursue the charges to 
win a conviction in an attempt to prove his violations were not particularly 
egregious because the party was guilty of the crime anyway?
158
  If an ethics 
complaint is not filed until after the proceeding is completed, a substantial 
amount of time passes before the ethics charge is adjudicated, leaving many of 
those who formed their opinions of the accused oblivious to the proceeding.  
Because ethics complaints are not typically filed until after the criminal 
proceeding, it is unlikely that those victimized by a prosecutor’s impermissible 
extrajudicial statements will reap the potential reputational protection that 
accompanies the Bar’s finding that a prosecutor violated the ethics rules. 
Second, the complaint alleging the violation must be highly publicized.  If 
the filing of an ethics complaint, and the ultimate finding as well, are not 
highly publicized, the public has no opportunity to change its perception of the 
accused, leaving the indicted individual’s reputation just as damaged as it was 
before the complaint was filed.  The level of publicity the ethics complaint 
receives is highly correlated with the first factor—the timing of the complaint.  
If the complaint is filed while the case is ongoing, it receives much attention as 
part of the “play by play.”  If the complaint is filed after the case has 
concluded, public interest in the matter is likely to have waned, in which case 
news of the complaint, as well as the ultimate findings, are less newsworthy, 
resulting in less public awareness of the complaint.  Given the norm that ethics 
complaints are not filed during ongoing criminal proceedings, ethics 
complaints against a prosecutor will not receive the prominent media attention 
required to negate the reputational damage suffered from a prosecutor’s 
impermissible public statements. 
 
 155. See Avila & Setrakian, supra note 63 (“[N]o one in Durham can remember a case where 
a district attorney had to defend himself on ethics charges in an ongoing case.”). 
 156. Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 21. 
 157. See Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Could be Ousted, supra note 26. 
 158. See id. 
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Third, to ensure the adequacy of this remedy, the violation alleged in the 
ethics complaint must be accompanied by something more than a violation of 
Rule 3.8(f).  The remedial aspect of an ethics complaint depends on whether or 
not the public views the prosecutor’s actions as misleading.  The public must 
view the prosecutor as an untrustworthy source of information, which would 
lead it to discount his public statements that harmed the reputations of the 
accused.  However, even if the prosecutor is charged with and ultimately found 
to have violated Rule 3.8(f), the public is not likely to feel as though his 
statements were inaccurate, without something more.  This “something more” 
consists of another ethics violation, such as withholding exculpatory evidence 
from the defense or engaging in deceitful conduct: two violations for which 
Nifong was accused and convicted.
159
 These additional violations 
communicated that Nifong engaged in dishonest conduct and thus his public 
statements may have been misleading as well.
160
 
If a prosecutor is charged solely with violating Rule 3.8(f), the prosecutor 
is accused of making impermissible public comments that tend to heighten the 
public condemnation of the accused; this charge does not communicate to the 
public that the statements were in any way inaccurate or that the source of the 
statements was untrustworthy.  If the public has no reason to doubt the veracity 
of the statements that harmed the reputations of the accused, the fact that the 
prosecutor is charged with impermissibly disseminating these statements to the 
public does little to rehabilitate the reputations of those who were the subject 
of the impermissible commentary.  In other words, the public is not likely to 
discount the credibility of the prosecutor simply because he violated a rule by 
speaking too freely.  Thus, if a prosecutor violates Rule 3.8(f) and the State Bar 
brings no additional charges, the accused’s reputational damage will not be 
offset by the ethics charge or even the eventual finding of a violation. 
The formal accusation that Nifong violated the North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and especially his eventual disbarment, helped 
rehabilitate the reputations of the indicted Duke lacrosse players.  While the 
ethics complaint served as a partial remedy in this case, in many others it 
would not.  Unless the ethics charges are filed while the public is widely 
interested in the controversy, the media gives the news of the complaint and 
finding substantial airplay, and the prosecutor is found to have violated a rule 
that causes the public to doubt the damaging statements made by the 
prosecutor, the ethics complaint will not alter the public’s view of the accused.  
The necessity of the unlikely simultaneous presence of these factors in most 
situations forecloses the notion that an ethics complaint could serve as an 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52. 
 160. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 18; Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, para. 117, at 20–24. 
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adequate remedy to the reputational damage suffered by the accused at the 
hands of a prosecutor’s impermissible extrajudicial statements. 
4. A Remedy Embedded in the North Carolina Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
Rule 3.6 contains a provision that has, thus far, proven to be the most 
effective reputational remedy available to the three indicted lacrosse players, 
and could potentially benefit others who find themselves victimized by an 
overzealous prosecutor’s improper statements.  Rule 3.6(c) provides: 
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a 
reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the 
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s client.  A statement made pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be limited to such information as is reasonably necessary to mitigate the 
recent adverse publicity.
161
 
The comment following Rule 3.6 recognizes that when a party does not 
abide by the ethics rules limiting extrajudicial statements, the other side may 
feel compelled to respond to mitigate the damage.
162
  The purpose of this 
provision is to allow a party to respond to prejudicial public commentary by 
the opposition’s attorney in an attempt to lessen “any resulting adverse impact 
on the adjudicative proceeding” that may result from another’s statements.
163
  
While the stated purpose of the rule is to combat prejudice, the defense’s 
responsive statements serve an additional purpose: they offer the public an 
alternative to the prosecutor’s point of view.  This alternative version, if 
persuasive, serves as a significant remedy because the public receives 
information that calls into question the accuracy of the prosecutor’s 
extrajudicial statements. 
In the Duke lacrosse case, the defense achieved some success in the media, 
and in turn with the public, through its release of public statements and 
documents.
164
  The defense’s response to Nifong’s public statements caused 
the media to shift from reporting on the salacious details, to asking the 
question, “Are the three Duke lacrosse players innocent boys falsely 
accused?”
165
  “The nation’s opinion leaders at influential newspapers” cast 
aside weighty national issues such as Iraq and Darfur “to come to the defense 
of the three accused players.”
166
  An anecdotal example from a renowned New 
York Times columnist tracked the shift in media coverage that stemmed from 
 
 161. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (2006). 
 162. See id. R. 3.6 cmt. 7. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Stancill, supra note 13, at 4B. 
 165. Id. at 1B. 
 166. Id. 
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the defense’s response to Nifong’s public statements: the first column 
discussed how young men slip into depravity, while the second discussed the 
stages of witch hunts.
167
 
This drastic shift in the media’s focus was fed by the “accused players’ 
attorneys[’] [release of] a steady stream of leaks and court filings that cast 
doubt on almost everything about the case.”
168
  In response to Nifong’s 
statements, the defense team conducted press conferences referring to the 
alleged victim as the “false accuser”; granted 60 Minutes permission to review 
“nearly the entire case file” and allowed their clients to participate in a 
nationally televised prime time interview with Ed Bradley; attacked the 
prosecutor’s conduct and the police department’s lineup procedure; disclosed a 
favorable polygraph test; and released DNA results that tended to exculpate 
their clients.
169
  The release of this information resulted in favorable publicity, 
which led to two concrete examples of how this release of information 
improved the players’ standing in the public eye: Duke University, which 
suspended the two yet-to-graduate players from school, invited the two players 
to return before the trial began and United States Representative Walter Jones 
publicly called for the United States Attorney General to review Nifong’s 
conduct.
170
  The defense’s ability to publicly respond to Nifong’s public 
assertions without fear of sanction under the North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct provided them with the tools to influence public opinion, 
resulting in the mitigation of the reputational damage caused by Nifong’s 
public statements. 
While Rule 3.6(c) certainly served as a reputational remedy in this case, 
again, there are reasons to believe that it is inadequate in most others.  The 
remedial aspect of the defense’s ability to plead its side of the case to the 
media depends heavily on the amount of coverage news organizations grant the 
retorts.
171
  If the media deems the story to be non-newsworthy, the retorts, 
although perhaps persuasive, receive minimal coverage and are unable to 
lessen the reputational damage caused by the prosecutor’s indiscretions. 
Perhaps the most significant limitation to this remedy in a criminal 
proceeding is the precarious question it presents the defense team: is it wise to 
release statements and seemingly favorable information and risk presenting 
potential jurors with information that may inhibit a future defense?  If the 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Niolet et al., supra note 39, at 14A; Stancill, supra note 13, at 4B; Bradley, supra 
note 8. 
 170. Chris Cuomo, Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, Duke Reinstates Embattled Lacrosse 
Players, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 3, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id= 
2768179&page=1; Rep. Walter Jones Wants Probe of District Attorney Nifong Handling Duke 
Rape Case, supra note 32. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 164–69. 
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defense team decides to release statements and information to the media, 
potential jurors will likely view this information and remember it.  By 
releasing the information at an early date, the defense attorneys in essence lock 
themselves into a defense before trial.  While there is no hard and fast rule 
preventing them from changing the story to fit a different defense strategy, as a 
practical matter, any jurors who paid attention to the media coverage at the 
time the defense released its original story would by extremely skeptical of a 
changed story at trial.  Thus, the defense team is left with a choice, which is 
really no choice at all: either attempt to salvage the reputation of the 
defendants or wait to present the defense at trial in order to maintain the best 
possible chance of preventing the defendants from going to prison.  In the 
Duke case, the defense team took a seemingly calculated risk and aggressively 
respond to Nifong’s public statements.
172
  While the Duke lacrosse attorneys’ 
defense strategy was successful, the strategy employed is coupled with the 
significant risk of undermining a potential defense at trial.  This risk is likely to 
deter many from taking a similar approach. 
B. The Feasibility of a Defamation Suit 
When discussing remedies available to the accused in the Duke lacrosse 
case, many ask, why not sue the prosecutor for defamation?  If not the 
prosecutor, can the players sue the state? After all, the prosecutor is employed 
by the state and made statements to the public that seem to be untrue, and these 
statements severely harmed the boys’ reputations.  A defamation suit would 
potentially provide the players with monetary compensation for their injured 
reputations.  However, because Nifong is a county prosecutor, a position 
created by the North Carolina Constitution,
173
 the chances of a successful 
defamation action against the county, the state, or the prosecutor in his official 
capacity are remote.  If the players sue Nifong for defamation in his personal 
capacity, the particularly egregious facts of his case make a successful 
outcome likely.  However, in most cases, public official immunity renders a 
defamation suit against a prosecutor impractical.  This section discusses the 
various difficulties that arise when pursuing a defamation action in this 
context. 
 
 172. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 173. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18. 
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In North Carolina, a “defamation”
174
 action is a rooted in the common law.  
Defamatory comments are actionable if the communication “tend[s] to 
prejudice another in his reputation . . . .”
175
  A communication is deemed 
defamation per se if an individual makes an accusation to a third party 
accusing another of “commit[ting] a crime involving moral turpitude.”
176
  
Once a false statement is deemed defamation per se, “a prima facie 
presumption of malice and a conclusive presumption of legal injury and 
damage arises . . . .”
177
  However, statements which are defamatory may 
nonetheless be protected by a qualified privilege.
178
  Before such a 
privilege is addressed, an examination of the applicable immunities 
afforded to Nifong, North Carolina, and Durham County is appropriate. 
If the accused lacrosse players sue Nifong in his official capacity, they 
must overcome the protection of sovereign immunity.  Generally, 
governmental or sovereign immunity “grants the state, its counties, and its 
public officials, in their official capacity, an unqualified and absolute immunity 
from law suits”
179
 stemming from “torts committed while performing a 
governmental function.”
180
  A governmental function, as distinguished from a 
proprietary function, “is one in which only a governmental agency could 
engage . . . .”
181
  For example, courts determined that a county entering into a 
lease agreement is an action proprietary in nature,
182
 while law enforcement is 
governmental in nature.
183
  While this immunity is absolute and unqualified,
184
 
 
 174. Defamation is used here as a generic term to describe the causes of action of libel—
which is written—and slander—which is spoken.  See Phillips v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County 
Bd. of Educ., 450 S.E.2d 753, 756 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).  However, “[w]hen defamatory words 
are spoken with the intent that the words be reduced to writing, and the words are in fact written, 
the publication is both slander and libel.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  While the correct 
terminology for the cause of action is either libel or slander, for sake of simplicity, defamation 
will be used in place of libel and slander, throughout.  See id. 
 175. Averitt v. Rozier, 458 S.E.2d 26, 28 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). 
 176. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Murder and kidnapping are examples of two crimes 
involving moral turpitude.  Id. at 28–29. 
 177. Id. at 28. 
 178. See infra text accompanying notes 220–28. 
 179. Dalenko v. Wake County Dep’t of Human Servs., 578 S.E.2d 599, 603 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 180. Price v. Davis, 512 S.E.2d 783, 786 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). 
 181. Data Gen’l Corp. v. County of Durham, 545 S.E.2d 243, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 182. See id. 
 183. Schlossberg v. Goins, 540 S.E.2d 49, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).  The court found that 
although the police officers were alleged to have severely and repeatedly beaten a suspect during 
an apprehension, the beating occurred during the performance of a governmental function.  Id. at 
52, 56–57. 
 184. Price, 512 S.E.2d at 786. 
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it can be waived if the state consents to suit, purchases liability insurance, or 
enacts a statute that waives suit for particular torts.
185
 
In this case, Nifong (in his official capacity), Durham County, and the 
State of North Carolina are likely immune from a defamation suit.  When 
Nifong made his statements during press interviews, he was carrying out a 
governmental function: he was speaking to the Durham community regarding 
an alleged crime, which his office was preparing to prosecute.  Although there 
is no authority on point, just as the broad description of “law enforcement” is a 
governmental function, by analogy it seems the closely related prosecutorial 
process would also qualify.  Thus, even if his statements were otherwise 
actionable, because he appeared to commit the tort while carrying out a 
governmental function, the accused cannot bring a defamation suit against 
Nifong in his official capacity, the state, or the county. 
The suit may still go forward, however, if the immunity is waived.  There 
is no reason to believe that North Carolina or Durham would waive immunity 
by consenting to such a suit.  Furthermore, although North Carolina has a 
statute that makes funds available to those found to have been injured by the 
negligent acts of government employees, negligence does not include the tort 
of defamation, thus making the statute inapplicable.
186
  Since this defamation 
suit is merely hypothetical at this point, it is difficult to come to a definitive 
answer on the issue of waiver through the purchase of liability insurance.  If a 
governmental entity purchased liability insurance, sovereign immunity is 
waived, but only to the extent that the policy covers the particular tort 
committed and only up to the amount of coverage provided by the policy.
187
  
Thus, if the policy “excludes claims against the insured for [defamation],” 
immunity is not waived.
188
  Without the insurance policy, a definitive answer 
as to waiver based upon liability insurance is not available.  Assuming there is 
no insurance policy that provides adequate coverage and the state does not 
consent to being sued, since no statutory provision provides relief for a 
government official’s defamation, sovereign immunity remains intact, thereby 
barring any defamation suit brought against Nifong in his official capacity, 
Durham County, or North Carolina. 
 
 185. See id. (state may waive immunity through consent or purchase of insurance); Mazzucco 
v. North Carolina Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 228 S.E.2d 529, 531 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (state may 
waive immunity through enactment of statute). 
 186. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-291 (2005); Mazzucco, 228 S.E.2d at 531. 
 187. See Schlossberg, 540 S.E.2d at 53 (immunity is waived up to the amount that insurance 
covers the damages); Houpe v. City of Statesville, 497 S.E.2d 82, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) 
(immunity is waived only for claims covered by insurance). 
 188. Houpe, 497 S.E.2d at 90. 
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Since the players, absent a waiver, cannot sue the state or the county for 
defamation, their next best option is to sue Nifong personally.
189
  As a starting 
point, keep in mind that “prosecutors are virtually immune from civil 
liability.”
190
  In order to succeed in a suit against Nifong in his personal 
capacity, the accused players would have to overcome his public official 
immunity.
191
  Public official immunity shields an official from “personal 
liability for mere negligence in the performance of his duties, but he is not 
shielded from liability if his alleged actions were corrupt or malicious or if he 
acted outside and beyond the scope of his duties.”
192
  The policy behind this 
immunity is that “it would be difficult to find those who would accept public 
office . . . if they were to be held personally liable for acts or omissions 
involved in the exercise of discretion and sound judgment which they had 
performed to the best of their ability . . . .”
193
  Thus, to succeed in a suit for 
defamation, one must “allege . . . and prove . . . that [the official’s] act . . . was 
corrupt, or malicious . . . or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of 
his duties.”
194
 
 
 189. Suing Nifong personally may not be ideal because a state prosecutor may not have the 
financial resources to pay the sort of damages the players would seek. 
 190. Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 24.  The commission goes on to state: “The only 
significant deterrent upon prosecutors is the possibility of disciplinary sanction.”  Id. at 24. 
 191. As a side note, Nifong, as a prosecutor, enjoys absolute immunity for any defamation 
that occurs during the course of a judicial proceeding.  See Mazzucco, 228 S.E.2d at 532.  Thus, 
he cannot be sued for any defamatory statements made in the course of a trial or in any 
documents filed with the court.  See id.  Likewise, Nifong enjoys the same absolute immunity 
from a malicious prosecution suit.  Id.  Furthermore, a section 1983 action against Nifong for his 
pubic statements is equally doubtful.  In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, a prosecutor was accused of 
making false and inflammatory statements to the press before his trial, “thereby defaming him, 
resulting in deprivation of his right to a fair trial, and causing the jury to deadlock rather than 
acquit.”  509 U.S. 259, 276–77 (1993).  Buckley filed suit, claiming the deprivation of due 
process.  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 798–99 (7th Cir. 1994).  On remand, the 
Seventh Circuit held that his due process claim was “doomed” unless he could show the state 
“failed to provide judicial procedures adequate to guard against the effects of pretrial publicity 
generated by the prosecutor.”  Id. at 799.  Thus, unless the accused is convicted, it does not 
appear the claim is actionable, because the procedures adopted by the court, whatever they may 
be, resulted in a beneficial result for the defendant.  In the Duke case, there will be no trial 
because the case was dismissed.  Thus, the players will have difficulty claiming their due process 
rights were violated. 
 192. Schlossberg, 540 S.E.2d at 56 (internal quotations omitted). 
 193. Miller v. Jones, 32 S.E.2d 594, 597 (N.C. 1945). 
 194. Hawkins v. North Carolina, 453 S.E.2d 233, 241 (N.C. Ct. App.1995) (internal 
quotations omitted).  An allegation of an intentional tort claim, such as defamation, is enough to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  See id. at 242.  This is because malice includes “the intentional 
doing of a wrongful act . . . with an intent to inflict an injury . . . ,” and “malice encompasses 
intent . . . .”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  However, since the plaintiff has the burden of proof 
and one of the three exceptions must be proven to bypass public official immunity, getting past 
summary judgment could prove a difficult task.   See Campbell v. Anderson, 576 S.E.2d 726, 730 
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In cases involving public official immunity, one must be careful to 
distinguish between a public official and a public employee.  While a public 
official enjoys the protection of this immunity, a public employee does not.
195
  
A public official occupies a position created by statute and exercises some 
level of discretion in the performance of his duties.
196
  Here, Nifong is clearly a 
public official, for his position is created by the North Carolina Constitution
197
 
and his duties entail discretionary acts, such as deciding what cases to 
prosecute.
198
 
Nifong loses the protection of his public official immunity if the players 
can show that Nifong’s statements were the result of a corrupt purpose.  
However, what corruption entails is not at all clear.  “Corruption” is defined as 
“inducement . . . by means of improper considerations . . . to commit a 
violation of duty.”
199
  Using this definition, if Nifong’s public statements were 
motivated by bribery or political purposes, as opposed to the pursuit of justice, 
one could make a strong argument that his actions were corrupt.  Although 
there has been no allegation—and there is no reason to believe—that Nifong 
had any financial motive to hold the numerous press interviews, there is a 
strong indication that his motivation for making the extra judicial statements to 
the press was political.  After a thorough investigation of the Duke lacrosse 
rape case, from beginning to end, the North Carolina State Bar stated, “we can 
draw no other conclusion but that those initial statements that [Nifong] made 
were to further his political ambition.”
200
  This determination was likely based 
on the findings that Nifong was in the midst of seeking election, the sheer 
volume of public statements, and the certainty with which he spoke publicly 
given the contrary information we now know he had but did not disclose.
201
 
Although the commission determined that Nifong’s statements were driven 
by political motivations, in most cases, it would be very difficult to prove that 
a prosecutor’s statements were politically motivated.  A recent case from the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the question of whether a rape 
occurred is one for the jury, even when the accuser’s statements are “all over 
 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (summary judgment is appropriate when the complaint does not offer 
evidence from which the existence of an exception can be inferred). 
 195. Hawkins, 453 S.E.2d at 242. 
 196. Vest v. Easley, 549 S.E.2d 568, 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 197. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18. 
 198. State v. Ward, 555 S.E.2d 251, 260 (N.C. 2001). 
 199. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (3d ed. 1993). 
 200. Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 17. 
 201. See id. at 17; see also Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Discipline, supra note 55, paras. 14, 15, 23, 26 (describing Nifong’s private acknowledgment of 
the case’s weaknesses and his unwavering public statements that a rape had occurred). 
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the place.”
202
  Even if there were “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies” in the 
victim’s testimony, the question of credibility was one for the jury and “[did] 
not fall within the province of the trial judge or the appellate courts.”
203
  If the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that a victim’s accusation of rape, 
no matter how questionable, is enough to survive a motion to dismiss, 
defendants will have a very difficult time arguing that a prosecutor spoke to the 
press for purely political purposes when he had an accusation, which is enough 
to get the case before a jury.  Rather, it would take a special set of 
circumstances, such as a reelection campaign, coupled with the prosecutor 
making statements behind closed doors contrary to his public comments, that 
would allow one to conclude that a prosecutor’s motivation for speaking was 
purely political.  These special circumstances are unlikely to arise (unless the 
prosecutor is extremely sloppy, as Nifong was), and thus, in most cases, 
corruption will be difficult to establish. 
Likewise, the players here will likely be able to prove malice, but it is 
unlikely other defendants will be able to do the same.  “Malice is defined as 
the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an 
intent to inflict an injury . . . .”
204
  To prove actual malice in a defamation 
context, the players must show “ill-will or personal hostility on the part of the 
declarant . . . or . . . that the declarant published the defamatory statement with 
knowledge that it was false [or] with reckless disregard for the truth or with a 
high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.”
205
  The existence of ill-will or 
personal hostility may be proven through evidence of an extrinsic nature—that 
is, evidence other than the statement.
206
  The statements, as well as the 
circumstances surrounding publication, are also evidence to be considered.
207
 
While the statements themselves are certainly damaging to the reputations 
of the accused, it is unlikely the players can produce sufficient evidence to 
prove that Nifong’s statements were a result of personal hostility.  In making 
his statements to the press, Nifong did not appear to be speaking with the 
 
 202. State v. Lofton, No. COA05-1231, 2006 WL 2946888, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2006). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Hawkins v. North Carolina, 453 S.E.2d 233, 242 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 205. Clark v. Brown, 393 S.E.2d 134, 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Kwan-Sa You v. 
Roe, 387 S.E.2d 188, 193 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 206. See e.g., Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 76 (N.C. 1962) (“[M]alice may be proved by 
some extrinsic evidence, such as ill-feeling, or personal hostility, or threats . . . ”); Clark, 393 
S.E.2d at 139 (holding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to actual malice because 
defendant’s public comments regarding the reason for firing the plaintiff occurred just after 
plaintiff’s mother was quoted in a newspaper as supporting defendant’s political opponent); 
Kwan-Sa You, 387 S.E.2d at 193 (finding issue of fact as to personal hostility because plaintiff 
and defendant “had been at odds for some time”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 207. Ponder, 126 S.E.2d at 76. 
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intention of injuring the reputations of the accused.  Rather, he was making 
statements regarding a violent crime that he believed some lacrosse players 
committed and, according to the State Bar, was seeking to win a primary.
208
  In 
the context of a rape prosecution, one would expect some level of hostility 
because of the disturbing nature of the allegations.  However, given the 
circumstances surrounding the comments, namely that the statements were 
made during press interviews regarding an impending rape prosecution, the 
statements do not demonstrate an adequate level of personal hostility from 
which an intent to inflict injury on the reputations of the players can be 
inferred.  Furthermore, there is no extrinsic evidence that demonstrates 
Nifong’s personal hostility towards the accused at the time the statements were 
made, for the accused players and Nifong had no known prior dealings that 
could create such personal hostility. 
On the other hand, it seems likely that the accused players can establish 
that Nifong exhibited reckless disregard for the truth.  According to the 
findings of fact published by the State Bar, before Nifong made his first public 
comments, 
Nifong was briefed . . . about the status of the investigation to date.  [The 
detectives] discussed with Nifong a number of weaknesses in the case, 
including that [the accuser] had made inconsistent statements to the police and 
had changed her story several times, that the other dancer who was present at 
the party during the alleged attack disputed [the accuser’s] story of an alleged 
assault, that [the accuser] had already viewed two photo arrays and had not 
identified any alleged attackers, and that the three team captains had 
voluntarily cooperated with police and had denied that the alleged attack 
occurred.
209
 
“During or within a few days of the initial briefing,” Nifong apparently stated 
that the case would be very difficult to win and said, “[Y]ou know, we’re 
fucked.”
210
  Because the players can show that any assertion of certainty that a 
rape had occurred is completely divergent from the information that was 
available to Nifong and can pinpoint exactly when Nifong became aware of 
these facts, namely before he made his statements, the players can establish 
that Nifong exhibited reckless disregard for the truth, thus establishing malice. 
Again, in most situations, establishing that a prosecutor displayed reckless 
disregard for the truth is extremely difficult.  It is safe to say that most 
prosecutors who make impermissible extrajudicial statements that are 
damaging to the reputations of the accused will not be so blatantly reckless.  
For the majority of defendants, the scenario is likely to be closer to a situation 
 
 208. Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 17–18. 
 209. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
para. 14. 
 210. Id. para. 15. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
704 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:669 
where the prosecutor makes impermissible statements to the press about a 
defendant who the prosecutor thinks is guilty, with no regard for the damage 
the statements inflict on the reputation of the individual who has yet to be 
convicted in a court of law.  Under the current state of the law, so long as a 
prosecutor has some basis to believe the individual is guilty—say a victim 
claims she was raped and has a minimal level of credibility—he will be 
shielded from liability by public official immunity.  Therefore, although this 
particularly egregious violation by Nifong has the potential to expose him to 
liability, the current state of the law provides little hope for a defendant who is 
defamed by a minimally competent prosecutor. 
The last means of defeating Nifong’s public official immunity is to prove 
Nifong acted beyond the scope of his duties.  The scope of a North Carolina 
prosecutor’s duties is not entirely clear.  A North Carolina statute lays out the 
duties of the district attorney.
211
  While this statute enumerates specific 
duties—and giving interviews to the press is not listed—the statute does not 
provide an in-depth outline of the scope the district attorney’s duties.  Rather, it 
provides general duties such as “prosecute in a timely manner . . . all criminal 
actions . . . .”
212
 
It is not entirely clear what “prosecute” entails.  Does this duty include 
keeping the public abreast on the status of the prosecution?  North Carolina 
courts have not addressed this issue.  Courts in other jurisdictions have held 
that press conferences are within the scope of the duties of district attorneys or 
their representatives.
213
  In a section 1983 case, the United States Supreme 
Court determined that a prosecutor speaking at a press conference “did not act 
in his role as advocate for the State,” thus entitling the prosecutor to qualified 
immunity rather than absolute immunity.
214
  However, at the same time, the 
Court recognized that “[s]tatements to the press may be an integral part of a 
prosecutor’s job . . . and they may serve a vital public function.”
215
  While 
Buckley appears to be a source of guidance, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals cautioned otherwise, noting, “North Carolina law regarding the 
immunity of government actors to suit under state law claims differs from the 
law of immunity in federal section 1983 actions.”
216
 
The lack of clarity of North Carolina law provides significant cover for 
Nifong’s decision to speak to the press.  When tackling the scope of duties 
 
 211. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-61 (2005). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Pickering v. Sacavage, 642 A.2d 555, 559 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); see also Chase v. 
Grilli, 512 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the prosecutors had a duty to 
report on criminal activity in the community). 
 214. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
 215. Id. at 278. 
 216. Andrews v. Crump, 547 S.E.2d 117, 123 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
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question, the issue is not the actual outer boundaries of the scope, but rather 
whether the official’s determination that his actions were within the scope was 
reasonable.
217
  “In many cases, an officer is under a duty to make a preliminary 
determination of whether he has the authority” in question.
218
  When 
exercising this discretion, and taking action pursuant to it, the official is 
protected by official immunity even if the determination is wrong, so long as 
the decision is reasonable.
219
  Because there is no clear answer as to whether, 
in North Carolina, the scope of a district attorney’s duties includes providing 
interviews with the press, Nifong’s discretionary determination that he was 
acting within the scope of his duties cannot be said to be unreasonable, leaving 
his public official immunity intact.  This analysis would seem to apply to most 
prosecutors, barring specific precedent or legislation defining exactly what a 
prosecutor’s duty entails. 
Although it seems that Nifong’s public official immunity could be defeated 
by showing that his impermissible public statements involved corruption or 
malice, thereby making him subject to a defamation suit that the players would 
have a solid chance at winning, the typical defendant is unlikely to enjoy the 
benefit of the specific set of circumstances required for the prosecutor to by 
subject to such a suit. 
Even if the players were able to defeat the sovereign or public official 
immunity, Nifong’s otherwise defamatory speech could by protected by a 
qualified privilege.  The qualified privilege doctrine is rooted in the policy of 
“encouraging a full and fair statement by persons having a legal . . . duty to 
communicate their knowledge and information about a person in whom they 
have an interest to another who also has an interest in such person.”
220
  A 
statement is protected “when made (1) on subject matter . . . in which the 
declarant has an interest . . . (2) to a person having a corresponding interest . . . 
(3) on a privileged occasion, and (4) in a manner . . . warranted by the occasion 
and duty, right or interest.”
221
  If the statement is protected by a qualified 
privilege, the qualified privilege becomes an absolute privilege, unless malice 
and falsity can be proven.
222
 
While Nifong can make a case for the first three elements, his privilege 
almost certainly fails on the requirement that the statement be made in a 
manner warranted by the occasion.  This final element is not met if there is 
excessive publication of the defamatory material.
223
  Excessive publication 
 
 217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: IMMUNITIES § 895D cmt. g (1979). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Clark v. Brown, 393 S.E.2d 134, 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Averitt v. Rozier, 458 S.E.2d 26, 29 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
 223. See Troxler v. Charter Mandala Ctr., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
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occurs when the defamatory material is spoken “to anyone outside of those 
who had a corresponding interest in the communication . . . .”
224
  However, if 
“the matter is of public interest within a limited territory, [and] the publication 
takes place . . . beyond that territory,” the privilege remains intact so long as 
the publication beyond the territory is “incidental.”
225
 
In this case, Durham County and the surrounding community had a 
corresponding interest to Nifong’s communications regarding an alleged rape 
in their neighborhood.
226
  Nifong had an interest in relaying the status of the 
investigation to the community, and the citizens had a corresponding interest in 
learning of the progress of an investigation of a violent crime allegedly 
committed in their neighborhood.  However, by granting over fifty 
interviews,
227
 some of which were with national media outlets such as 
MSNBC,
228
 Nifong’s publication of the information, beyond those with a 
corresponding interest, cannot be deemed “incidental.”  Because Nifong 
granted dozens of interviews with various news outlets, both local and national 
in scope, Nifong’s public statements were not made in a manner fairly 
warranted by the occasion.  Thus, since the previously discussed immunities do 
not shield Nifong and his statements would not be protected by a qualified 
privilege, given the nature of his public accusations, it is likely that he would 
be liable for defamation.  However, as has been previously discussed, it is 
unlikely that a typical defendant would be able to get past a prosecutor’s public 
official immunity. 
The final major obstacle to a defamation action against a prosecutor is the 
statute of limitations.  In North Carolina, the statute of limitations for a 
defamation claim is one year.
229
  Thus, to preserve the claim, the action must 
begin within one year from the date of publication of the defamatory words.
230
  
Under normal circumstances, the one year statute of limitations would not be 
overly restrictive; an individual is likely to know whether he has been defamed 
rather quickly after the damaging words are published.  However, when a 
prosecutor is the potential defendant in a defamation suit, there are very real 
practical restraints that could prevent the harmed individual from filing a 
defamation suit until after the statute of limitations has run. 
First, if the prosecutor defames an individual who is the subject of an 
ongoing criminal investigation, the accused may be reluctant to anger the 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 78 (N.C. 1962). 
 226. See Clark v. Brown, 393 S.E.2d 134, 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he citizens and 
voters of the county . . . [have] a public interest in their elected district attorney’s official acts.”). 
 227. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 229. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-54(3) (2005). 
 230. Iadanza v. Harber, 611 S.E.2d 217, 222–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
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prosecutor.  The risk that the prosecutor, or a member of his office, would file 
charges as retribution is enough to justify foregoing the suit.  Moreover, 
because falsity must be proven to succeed in a defamation suit,
231
 filing a 
defamation claim against the prosecutor gives him an incentive to go forward 
with the prosecution in order to prove, in a court of law, the truth of the 
statements.
232
  Depending on how long the individual remains a suspect, the 
statute of limitations may run before the victim of the defamation becomes 
comfortable filing suit, without fear of reprisal. 
If an individual charged with a crime is publicly defamed by a prosecutor 
in the run up to a criminal trial, he is all but forced to wait until the conclusion 
of the criminal proceeding to pursue a defamation suit.  If the defendant were 
to sue the prosecutor, he would face the possibility of concurrent proceedings 
where he would have to present evidence that proves the falsity of the charges 
in the civil suit
233
 and defend himself in the criminal suit.  No competent 
defense attorney would allow such maneuvering, for the tactical disadvantages 
are both obvious and perilous.  With a criminal proceeding of reasonable 
length, it is possible the statute of limitations could run before there is a 
legitimate chance to file a defamation claim against the prosecutor. 
Presuming it was feasible for the accused Duke players to file a defamation 
suit, and assuming Nifong’s last damaging out of court statement was made on 
April 11, 2006, which is the most recent extrajudicial comment referenced in 
the State Bar’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the players would 
have had to file their defamation suit on April 11, 2007, the same day the 
Attorney General dismissed the case.
234
 
While at first glance a defamation action appears to be a viable remedy, the 
various immunities afforded to the state, the county, and the prosecutor make a 
successful outcome doubtful.  Assuming the players are able to circumvent the 
immunities, the statute of limitations forecloses the players’ ability to seek 
redress through a common law defamation suit.  Other defendants victimized 
by a prosecutor’s impermissible public statements are likely to be prevented 
from filing suit not only by the various immunities, but also by the statute of 
limitations. 
 
 231. Clark, 393 S.E.2d at 138. 
 232. An interesting issue to explore would be the conflict of interest issues that arise if a 
defendant brought a defamation action against a prosecutor during a prosecution of a criminal 
matter. 
 233. Clark, 393 S.E.2d at 138. 
 234. See Amended Complaint, supra note 32, paras. 15–16; Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, para. 50; OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, supra note 29. 
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III.  SOLUTIONS 
While under certain circumstances individuals may have a mechanism for 
rehabilitating their reputations, most individuals must rely on deterrence and 
currently, “[t]he only significant deterrent upon prosecutors is the possibility of 
disciplinary sanction.”
235
  Minor changes to the ethics rules, as well as the state 
laws, could both deter the conduct and broaden the protection for those 
harmed.  Slight changes to Rule 3.8(f) would provide increased awareness and 
enforcement of the provision, which would deter prosecutors from making 
prohibited extrajudicial statements.  Purchasing insurance and amending the 
North Carolina statutes to waive sovereign immunity are two other possible 
solutions that would provide increased protection for those damaged by 
impermissible comments made by a prosecutor. 
While North Carolina Rule 3.8(f), as well as the corresponding ABA 
Model Rule, makes it clear that a prosecutor should not make extrajudicial 
statements that “have a substantial likelihood of heightening the public 
condemnation of the accused,”
236
 the rule seems to be an afterthought and is 
rarely enforced.
237
  To encourage increased enforcement, Rule 3.8(f) should be 
changed in a way that makes it clear that a violation of the rule is a serious 
matter and that provides clear guidance as to what sort of comments “have a 
substantial likelihood of heightening the public condemnation of the 
accused.”
238
 
A relatively minor modification to Rule 3.8(f) would increase the 
likelihood of enforcement.  First, the rule should include language that makes 
it clear that a violation of the rule is a serious matter because of the resulting 
reputational damage that follows.  While any violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct is by definition serious, it is necessary to include the 
language to communicate how potentially devastating a violation can be to the 
reputation of the accused.
239
  It is tempting to dismiss the importance of the 
rule because the reputation of the accused is, or will be, damaged by an 
indictment and thus the impact of further commentary is easily misjudged.
240
  
However, as demonstrated above, a prosecutor’s extrajudicial statements 
compound the damage.  By including language that communicates the serious 
 
 235. Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 24. 
 236. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2006); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.8(f) (2006). 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
 238. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f). 
 239. This modification could be as simple as adding a sentence at the end of paragraph (f) that 
states, “due to the potential damage such comments could have on the reputation of the accused, a 
violation of this rule is considered a serious matter.” 
 240. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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damage a prosecutor’s impermissible public statements may have, the rule will 
receive increased attention, which should result in increased enforcement. 
Second, the rule, or the comment, should be amended to include some 
guidance as to what sort of statements more likely than not constitute a 
violation.  For example, Rule 3.6(a) prohibits “extrajudicial statements that . . . 
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding . . . .”
241
  Comment 5 following the rule gives examples of “certain 
subjects that are more likely than not to have a materially prejudicial effect on 
a proceeding . . . , ” such as “the character, credibility, reputation or criminal 
record of a party, . . . the possibility of plea of guilty. . . or contents of any 
confession, . . . [and] any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant . . . .”
242
  By including these examples in the comment, lawyers have 
a more precise idea of the sort of statements the rule prohibits.  Thus, when an 
attorney makes a statement pertaining to subjects listed in Comment 5 
following Rule 3.6, the statement is likely to receive close scrutiny to 
determine if a violation has occurred.  By including concrete examples of 
statements that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public 
condemnation of the accused in 3.8(f), comments that relate to those categories 
will receive heightened scrutiny as well.
243
 
Another possible solution is for the state or counties to purchase liability 
insurance that waives sovereign immunity.  The liability insurance must cover 
damages resulting from defamation; otherwise, the insurance will not serve as 
a waiver.
244
  Furthermore, since sovereign immunity is waived only to the 
extent that the insurance policy covers the damages awarded, the policy must 
provide sufficient coverage to ensure adequate funds are available to the 
injured party.
245
  However, any waiver should be accompanied by an extension 
of the statute of limitations for defamation actions in order to ensure the 
practical availability of the suit.
246
  Waiving sovereign immunity through the 
purchase of insurance, accompanied by an extension of the statute of 
limitations when the suit is against a prosecutor, guarantees a remedy to those 
damaged by the prosecutor. 
 
 241. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a). 
 242. Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5. 
 243. The comment should also include examples of what sort of statements qualify as 
“statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s 
action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose . . . .”  Id. 3.8(f).  Perhaps a reference 
to the safe harbor in Rule 3.6 would be sufficient to allow the sort of analysis in Part II.A.2, 
supra. 
 244. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 245. See id. 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 229–34.  The statute could allow for an increase in 
the statute of limitations if a prosecutor is the subject of the defamation suit. 
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Waiver of sovereign immunity through statute is another possibility for 
securing a remedy for the accused.
247
  Currently, the State of North Carolina 
has waived sovereign immunity for all negligence actions against state officers 
and employees, up to $500,000.
248
  The statute created an administrative court, 
named the “North Carolina Industrial Commission,” which is vested with 
jurisdiction over all negligence claims against state officers and employees.
249
  
The statute provides, “The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or 
not each individual claim arose . . . under circumstances where the State of 
North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the laws of North Carolina.”
250
  Thus, the legislature created 
an administrative court where those victimized by the negligence of a state 
actor can seek redress through the state, and the legislature also specified the 
standard under which the court would determine the state’s liability: North 
Carolina negligence law. 
North Carolina could amend this statute to provide the North Carolina 
Industrial Commission jurisdiction over any claims for damages when the 
North Carolina State Bar deems a prosecutor violated Rule 3.8(f).  If the State 
Bar finds that a prosecutor violated Rule 3.8(f), the individual harmed by the 
comments made in violation of the rule would be afforded the opportunity to 
present a case for damages before the administrative court.  Just as the current 
statute proscribes the standard for granting relief in a negligence action—the 
state negligence laws—the amended statute would presume relief is necessary 
if the State Bar finds Rule 3.8(f) was violated, leaving only the matter of 
damages to be determined.  While the scope provision of the North Carolina 
Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[v]iolation of a Rule should not 
give rise itself to a cause of action against a lawyer,”
251
 there is nothing 
preventing the state from enacting a law that creates liability if the rule is 
found to be broken.  Furthermore, the cause of action will not be against the 
lawyer who broke the rule, but rather against the state.  Thus, enacting such a 
rule would not undermine the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Enacting this administrative remedy, in accordance with overhauling Rule 
3.8(f), is the best solution for all parties involved.  From the plaintiff’s 
perspective, this is a viable solution because it affords the opportunity for 
monetary compensation for any reputational damage sustained.  There is no 
immunity to contend with, for public official immunity is afforded to the 
 
 247. Douglas Dowd, a renowned plaintiff’s attorney in the Saint Louis area and a good friend, 
provided the impetus for the development of this proposed solution. 
 248. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-299.2(a) (2005). 
 249. Id. § 143-291(a). 
 250. Id. 
 251. N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 0.2 cmt. 7 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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prosecutor when he is sued personally,
252
 and enacting the statute waives 
sovereign immunity up to the statutorily proscribed amount.
253
  Moreover, 
unlike a defamation action, there is no qualified privilege or statute of 
limitations that could potentially prohibit recovery when otherwise 
warranted.
254
  If the improved Rule 3.8(f) is enforced, individuals defamed by 
prosecutors would be afforded a remedy for their damaged reputations. 
From the state’s perspective, this administrative solution is preferable to 
waiving sovereign immunity through the purchase of liability insurance 
because it limits potential litigation.  By waiving sovereign immunity, anyone 
would have the right to pursue a defamation action in state court.
255
  The state 
would be forced to bear the expense of defending itself against anyone who 
filed suit.  In the administrative solution above, the state’s involvement, other 
than the State Bar proceeding, would be limited to contesting damage claims 
from those who were the subject of a prosecutor’s comments made in violation 
of Rule 3.8(f). 
Relatively straightforward modifications of a provision of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the North Carolina statute waiving sovereign 
immunity for negligence claims would provide a remedy for those damaged by 
a prosecutor’s extrajudicial statements prohibited by Rule 3.8(f).  If the statute 
were amended in the manner discussed above, given Nifong’s violation of 
Rule 3.8(f),
256
 the accused Duke lacrosse players would have had an excellent 
chance of securing compensation from the state for their damaged 
reputations.
257
  In the Duke case, perhaps the only limitation to securing the 
appropriate amount of compensation for the damage done to their reputation 
would be the $500,000 statutory ceiling.
258
 
CONCLUSION 
The Duke lacrosse rape spectacle is a tale of complete tragedy.  A night of 
drinking and debauchery at the Duke lacrosse house ended up being more than 
the team members bargained for.  Soon after the party, the Durham District 
Attorney, Mike Nifong, conducted press interviews discussing the details of a 
gang rape that he was certain had occurred.  The media was eager to indulge 
Nifong in his repeated commentary on the case, resulting in countless 
interviews and articles implicating Duke lacrosse players in a horrific crime.  
Nifong granted numerous interviews that provided the material for seemingly 
 
 252. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 220–33 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Amended Complaint, supra note 32. 
 257. See discussion supra Part III. 
 258. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-299.2(a) (2005). 
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endless speculation on the details of the alleged rape.  After the subsequent 
indictment of three Duke lacrosse players, the defense team waged a 
formidable media campaign, during which they were able to win the support of 
the media and public through its artful disclosure of fact after fact, which 
revealed a scenario that caused every rational mind to question whether a rape 
ever occurred.  The latest developments in the case seem promising for the 
accused Duke lacrosse players: Nifong dropped the most serious of the three 
charges, was brought up on ethics charges, recused himself from the case, and 
the North Carolina Attorney General’s office declared the players 
“innocent.”
259
  Moreover, Nifong was eventually found to have violated 
numerous ethical provisions and was disbarred for his conduct.
260
  However, 
even though all the charges against them were finally dropped, for the players, 
it was a Pyrrhic victory.  The accused players will likely forever be known as 
the “accused rapists,” and to some unfamiliar with, or uninterested in, the facts, 
the “rapists.” 
Even with the egregious conduct of the prosecutor in this case, the 
reputational remedies available to the players are not promising.  While both 
the publicity surrounding Nifong being charged with, and ultimately found to 
have committed, multiple ethics violations as well as the defense’s sanctioned 
retorts to Nifong’s claims rehabilitated the players’ reputations to some degree, 
they are left with a legal framework that makes it difficult to obtain monetary 
redress.  Although the players would likely have been able to “pierce the cloak 
of immunity,”
261
 because of Nifong’s outrageous conduct,
262
 the time pressure 
brought to bear by the statute of limitations made it impractical for the players 
to pursue a defamation action.  While practicability is the concern for the 
accused in the Duke lacrosse case, monetary redress for reputational damage 
through a defamation action for other defendants is nearly unattainable. 
While some courts insist that the remedy for the individuals harmed by a 
prosecutor’s defamatory comments rests in the rules of professional conduct,
263
 
I am confident the accused Duke lacrosse players, whose reputations are 
forever damaged, will not feel whole, regardless of the severity of Nifong’s 
discipline.  A minor modification of Rule 3.8(f) coupled with a revision of a 
North Carolina statute, as suggested above, are concrete steps the legislature 
should take to ensure individuals victimized by a prosecutor’s impermissible 
 
 259. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, supra note 29. 
 260. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, supra note 55, 
para. 117, at 20–24. 
 261. Ellis v. White, 575 S.E.2d 809, 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 262. See supra text accompanying note 151. 
 263. Sims v. Barnes, 689 N.E.2d 734, 738 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“We note . . . that our 
decision will not leave actual and potential criminal defendants wholly unprotected from 
unscrupulous prosecuting attorneys . . . . [P]rosecutors are still subject to professional discipline if 
their actions stray beyond the bounds of ethical conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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comments in the future have an adequate avenue for monetary redress.  
Although a change in the system will do little to comfort the victims of this 
indisputably tragic tale, it will ensure there will not be a sequel, which is 
perhaps the best that can be done. 
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